THE OLD EMPIRE AND THE NEW

THE IMPERIAL STUDIES SERIES

EDITED BY

A. P. NEWTON, M.A., D.Lit., B.Sc.

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THE OLD EMPIRE AND THE NEW

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THE OLD EMPIRE AND THE NEW

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

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MCMXVII

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

THE British Empire has too long suffered from want of appreciation by the general public of the United Kingdom, and especially by the working classes. I use the word appreciation in its literal sense. The worth, the meaning of the Empire, have not been duly apprehended. It has been the victim of generalities and platitudes, of exaggeration on the one hand, on the other of passive indifference or active suspicion. It has not been, except to a very limited extent, the subject of sane and sober study. The war has come as a great stimulus to such study, and as a wholesome corrective of distorted views. It has removed—let us hope for ever—the mischievous prejudice which attached to the word Empire, has identified it with democracy and freedom, and has proved to demonstration its living and potent value alike to the citizens of the British Isles and to liberty-loving peoples throughout the world.

Some little time before the war a lecture by Mr. Sidney Low attracted attention to the necessity for promoting systematic study of the Empire, and the Senate of the University of London established a strong Imperial Studies Committee, of which Lord Milner was and is chairman, and Lord Bryce a member, which includes leading professors and teachers of the university,

together with other men of standing and experience. As vice-chairman of this committee I am able to write with some special knowledge of its work, and to testify to the ability, the enthusiasm and the organising power of its secretary, Dr. A. P. Newton. A little later, and in full collaboration with the university, the Royal Colonial Institute entered upon the same path, and makes a substantial yearly grant for payment of lecturers of the highest class on Empire subjects in various centres of the United Kingdom. Here again Dr. Newton has shouldered the burden of secretarial and organising work with conspicuous success.

Thus an Imperial Studies movement, practical and effective, has been started, and promises far wider development. The following is, in brief, the point of view. The British Empire is a great and beneficial organism, of which we in this country form the inmost part. It is unique alike in kind and extent, the result of growth to which no parallel can be found. Because it is *sui generis*, and because we live day by day in the middle of it, we do not realise what it is and what it means. We speak and think of it in terms which are inaccurate and misleading : our outlook has not widened as our island existence has widened : unthinking and unheeding members of the Commonwealth lag behind the Commonwealth itself. The Empire not merely deserves, it demands, not the attention only but the full understanding of our citizens. How can this be attained ? The citizens must be reached through the teachers : the teachers must be of the best quality : the universities, especially the younger universities in the great industrial centres, must provide and equip the

teachers : and the universities, while preaching to those outside, must practise within what they preach.

In other words, it is desired to co-ordinate classes and courses within the universities, as is being done in the University of London. So as to show how far the various branches of knowledge and science have a bearing upon the Empire, what resources for knowledge and for science the Empire provides or can be made to provide, if duly exploited : to emphasise what may be called the Empire side of research and study, not in order to advertise the Empire in any vulgar sense, but in order to bring home to its citizens all its potentialities and all that it entails.

When Imperial Studies are mentioned, history naturally rises first to view, and none can doubt that greater prominence than at present ought to be given to our overseas history in courses of study, examinations and textbooks. No history, for instance, is so fruitful as the history of our Overseas Empire, past and present, in the record of the beginnings of nations, because here all the circumstances of the birth and childhood of great peoples are absolutely clear and beyond dispute. There is no mist about the beginnings of the United States, of Canada, or Australia ; there is no uncertainty about the course of their development. Causes are known, effects are known, and the sequence of cause and effect. If the highest object of history is admonition and guidance from the past for the future, surely the clearest lessons can be drawn from overseas.

But history does not cover the whole field. Nothing covers the whole field other than the whole or almost the whole of knowledge. Where can constitutional law,

political science, economic and industrial problems, be better studied than within the wide range of the British Empire? Where can the geographer, the ethnologist, the botanist find more material? The list of Imperial Studies can be indefinitely prolonged.

Since the movement began, various courses of lectures, on various subjects, by divers lecturers, have been arranged and delivered; and in several instances the lectures have been published. But now Messrs. Dent & Sons have undertaken to publish what, it is hoped, will be a long series of books relating to Imperial problems in every aspect, and mainly consisting of Imperial Studies lectures, sometimes given by a single lecturer, sometimes by a group, the general editor of the series being Dr. Newton. It is sought to produce and to disseminate matter more substantial than is contained in a popular handbook, but less severe than the substance of a technical monograph: the books are intended to be suitable, on the one hand, for general readers, who read for solid information, and on the other for students who desire a general survey of a special subject as preliminary to more detailed study.

The present book, the first of the series, is historical. It is a collection of lectures given by Dr. Newton, as Rhodes lecturer, at University College. Under the appropriate title "The Old Empire and the New," he follows up the thread of continuity which runs through our overseas history, and which can never be too much emphasised or too abundantly illustrated. We have not annexed so many outlying parts of the world as artificial adjuncts to our islands: in the course of nature we have grown, by a constant, gradual process of widening, from

an island into a world-wide Commonwealth. This is the bedrock of accurate teaching about our Empire, and no one is better qualified to drive the truth home, with the combined force of knowledge and sympathy, than Dr. Newton. His book will be followed by a group of botanical lectures on the subject of "The Exploitation of Plants," these lectures having also been given at University College by various experts, and the book being edited by Professor F. W. Oliver, F.R.S. It will deal with the new work which has been done of late years in various regions of the Empire in the direction of making plants of greater use to man. The third book of the series will deal with "The Staple Trades of the Empire," and will be a collection of lectures delivered at the London School of Economics. Other books will follow—it is hoped—at the rate of about four volumes a year.

Thus there is ground for confidence that the many aspects of a many-sided empire will be better appreciated in the future than in the past: that lovers of one branch of knowledge or another will realise what riches of their own special brand are stored within the wide circle of His Majesty's dominions; and—most of all—that it will be brought home to citizens of the United Kingdom what their British citizenship gives and demands, how fair the heritage, how great the responsibility.

C. P. Lucas.

May, 1917.

CONTENTS

THE OLD EMPIRE AND THE NEW

I

THE CONTINUITY OF IMPERIAL HISTORY

THE differences that mark off the British Empire from other world states are numberless, but perhaps the most noticeable of them all, from an historical point of view, has been its extraordinary vitality and its power of resistance to shocks that would have shattered in pieces a more logically constructed and more rigidly centralised organism. The most terrible of those shocks was that cataclysm of civil war that in the last quarter of the eighteenth century tore the Empire in twain and doomed the severed parts of the Anglo-Saxon race on opposite sides of the Atlantic, though dowered with a common culture and desirous in the main of striving towards the same ideals, to seek them on separate paths and under different flags. The period of schism and armed conflict that began at Lexington in 1775 and closed with the Treaty of Versailles in 1783, marks, therefore, the end of the first period of Empire growth in ruin and apparent failure, and, as we may date the end of the "old Empire" in 1783, so we may note how a "new Empire" began at once to grow from that date

onwards. The new Empire has been planted in different fields, and has thriven in different ways, with a life more complex and diverse than that of the old, and yet it is essentially the descendant of its forerunner; despite the schism, its growth has been a real continuation of the earlier movements of English expansion, and it is the purpose of these lectures to point to the essential facts that emphasise this continuity, and to show how almost all our lines of Imperial precedent trace back to the lessons and experience that were gained in the old Empire of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

It is rarely in the life of an individual that he is afforded an opportunity of retrieving a capital mistake in the building up of his career; if at a crucial period a wrong decision has been made or a wrong course of conduct embarked upon, it is rarely possible for him to abandon that course and take up again the work on the right lines that he has discerned through the errors of the past. So in the development of nations, it has always proved exceedingly difficult to turn past errors to account and to build success upon the debris of failure. The European nations that first founded empires beyond the sea have long since fallen out from the struggle for world power and have shrunk back to the limits of their native land. The Portuguese, in whom was vested for more than a hundred years the greatest dominion in the Indian seas, had by the middle of the seventeenth century lost all but the merest fragments of their great possessions, and though for another century and a half they retained a great and prosperous colony in Brazil, that, too, at length severed its connection with the mother country,

and Portugal has long since ceased to play any part of importance in the world struggle.

Spain filled a greater and more lasting rôle, and for three centuries she retained a colonial dominion in the New World that was more widely extended and more populous than that of any other power; but the control of the home government became more and more irksome to her dominions, as retarding and cramping their possibilities of development; and when, in the world-wide upheaval of the French Revolution, the opportunity came to throw off the yoke, both governors and governed welcomed the parting with a sense of relief; the Spaniard returned to absorption in his domestic concerns, and Spain has shown no aspirations to take up again the task of colonisation that she laid down. So with Holland; her oversea empire grew to its maximum extent in less than fifty years, and it was only during that short period that the fertilising stream of colonists flowed from her shores. For a little while the Dutch held lands in all the quarters of the globe, but their strength was insufficient to sustain so great a burden; the rich Dutch empire in Brazil fell back to her Portuguese competitors, New Netherland was stolen away to become the English colony of New York, attempts to open up the great untouched lands of New Holland and New Zealand in the southern seas were peremptorily checked, and Dutch enterprise found all and more than all the work it could do in the maintenance and development of her trade and supremacy in the islands of the Indian Archipelago. The puny colonies of Sweden and of Denmark were never more than mere toys for powers which, anticipating the fashions

of a more modern age, had momentary aspirations for oversea power and "a place in the sun," though such aspirations had little chance of a continuing existence, and were before long forgotten, with their originators. France, however, has played a commanding part among the colonising peoples; for a century and a half French colonies and French oversea enterprise were of first-rate importance in the world, and it seemed as though she were the greatest of colonisers. But when in America and in India England succeeded in bringing the ambitious schemes of Lally and Dupleix to naught, the colonising activities of France seemed to have ended in utter ruin, and it appeared as though she, like Portugal, had dropped from the race. For more than a hundred years, say from 1763 to 1880, such a view might have been held with truth, though there was evidence that France had never entirely forgotten her mission over-sea. But the last thirty years have seen a wonderful revival of France's colonising power, and the foundation of a new French empire far more imposing in area and in possibilities than the old. The part played in the present war by French colonial troops is as striking as the part played by our own Indian army, and it should warn us to distrust the facile generalisation that France was incapable of colonisation, and that a French colony was of necessity a mismanaged failure.

It has been left for the British Empire to provide the outstanding exception to a general rule. By the Peace of Versailles the old empire, that had gradually been built up in the course of two centuries, was violently sundered; the greater number of King George III's subjects beyond the sea, having successfully vindicated

in arms their Declaration of Independence from the British Crown, formed for themselves a new nation state, and the only colonial possessions that were left to the mutilated Empire were a few West Indian islands, a fishing harbour or two round the mouth of the Saint Lawrence, some isolated fur-trading posts on the frozen shores of Hudson Bay, and the small French colony of Canada, with a population of only sixty thousand, that had been annexed to the British Crown but twenty years before. The old Empire before the schism had contained within its bounds some nineteen million people of British race, with the addition of the French Canadians and of a few hundred Spaniards in East and West Florida. In 1783 nearly four millions of the colonists abandoned their British citizenship, rather more than a fifth of the whole, and practically one-quarter of the population in the British Isles. Englishmen had already begun to acquire territorial dominion in India, but few foresaw the possibilities that lay before them, and to many capable observers at home and abroad it seemed as though England had played her oversea part to the end, that she should disembarrass herself as soon as might be of the debris of her empire, and concentrate her attention on the many tasks that awaited her in other directions that that of colonisation. A single sample of these gloomy forebodings must suffice. "It is asserted," wrote a colonist in 1784, "that regular supplies of provisions and necessaries [for the West Indies] may, with proper encouragement, be obtained from the remainder of the British colonies on the continent [of America]. These visionary suggestions are almost too ludicrous to be combated, and seem intended as a

political artifice to blind the eyes of the too credulous people and deceive them into a belief that their remaining territories in America are of considerable value. It is well known that the intenseness of the climate of Canada, with the difficulty of navigation, will scarcely admit of more than one voyage in the year to the West Indies, which require a regular and continued supply of provisions. As for the inhospitable regions of Nova Scotia, it will be a matter of wonder and a solace to humanity if by the unceasing industry of its inhabitants it will be able even to produce a sufficiency for their sustenance and support."

The sequel has been utterly different from that anticipated by these gloomy prophets, and the Empire in which we live has been in a material sense the wonderful growth of only a hundred and thirty years. In 1783 only Newfoundland, the smallest of our present self-governing dominions, contained a majority of population of British stock amounting to not more than a few hundreds, and it was dependent for its entire subsistence on the colonies that had broken away, for it was even said in the House of Commons in 1785 that neither Newfoundland nor Nova Scotia produced a sufficiency of food for their own people, and the latter territory was described as an uneven, barren place, not fit for mankind to dwell in, and apparently only created for the punishment of the people who inhabit it. To-day the self-governing dominions, Newfoundland, Canada, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand, contain within their boundaries nearly a third of all the white subjects of the Crown, and in the same one hundred and thirty years the British *raj* has spread out its beneficent control

from the coast plain of Madras and from the Ganges delta over the whole of the Indian peninsula up to its northern mountain barriers and beyond. The rich provinces of Malaya and all the British possessions in the Far East were in 1783 hardly dreamt of; the few small English factories of the eighteenth century upon the West African coast have swelled out into the great province of Nigeria, still with almost untouched stores of wealth, while in other parts of Africa there have been brought under the British flag territories of vast undeveloped resources and teeming native population. Egypt and the Sudan have been rescued from misrule and barbarism, rich islands have been added to the Empire in the West Indies and the Pacific, and the strategic points that guard the ocean routes of the world have all, with the single exception of Gibraltar, come under the British sway only within a hundred years.

The new Empire that has arisen is infinitely greater in resources and in world importance than the old Empire that was lost, and yet it is but an outgrowth and a consequence of it; it has grown up and been consolidated in ways that were laid down before 1783, and for a proper understanding of its problems and the methods of their solution we must search for precedents and clues in the history of the earlier time. In this search we are made to realise the extraordinary permanence and adaptability of our British traditions and their power of permeating and inspiring communities of men far from the island home whence they arose. This extraordinary continuity of its history is peculiar to the British Empire, for the new French colonial empire has little in common with the empire that was

lost in 1763. It has been built up by new methods that have derived far more from British experience than from the lessons of earlier French colonisation, while both the old and the new British empires were built up in one and the same continuing process.

If we examine closely our Imperial history we find that there has been development in three main directions. There has been, first, the establishment of population, mainly of British stock, in regions which were previously almost unpeopled, and the gradual development among the settlers of institutions closely akin to those at home; and, secondly, the acquisition of territories inhabited by an indigenous population in a low stage of civilisation, and the utilisation of those native peoples under British direction to provide labour for opening up the resources of their territory. Thirdly, there has been an imposition of order and justice in territories inhabited by peoples with an ancient and complex civilisation, but one that was static or retrograde in condition, and apparently in itself incapable of progress. The work of the old British Empire in the second of these directions as compared with that of Spain was insignificant, for English attempts to seize territory in tropical America were almost invariably unsuccessful, and it was left to the Spaniards and the Portuguese to exploit every tractable American race to the full. But in making these unsuccessful attempts on a small scale Englishmen acquired knowledge of the conditions to be dealt with, and learned by their mistakes and by the experience of other colonising nations.

In their first attempt in the seventeenth century to dominate an Asiatic civilisation, Englishmen were

hopelessly unsuccessful, and were quite outdistanced by their Dutch competitors. For the first forty years of that period the English East India Company devoted the greater part of its energies to the attempt to acquire control of the Spice Islands of the Malay Archipelago as heirs of the Portuguese, who by the exercise of naval power had made themselves masters there at the beginning of the sixteenth century; the Dutch, however, were prepared, in pursuit of their aim at domination, to expend considerable military efforts, backed by the whole power of the State, while the English could reckon on little or no help from the State, and were compelled to rely on their own private resources. They were, in consequence, hopelessly outdistanced, the Hollanders succeeded in crushing out all competition and in securing for themselves the mastery of the Eastern Seas, and the English merchants were compelled to concentrate their efforts for trade only upon the shores of mainland India. There, in the face of a strong native power, both English and Dutch were bound to try different methods and to secure opportunities for trade not by domination but by submission to the Indian authorities. In this course Englishmen persisted with modest commercial success for a century and a half, and during all that time the typical European attitude towards Asiatic power was that of deference and submissiveness. The lines for English policy in contact with an ancient civilisation were laid down in 1616 by Sir Thomas Roe, the first Englishman with a pretence to statesmanship who examined Indian conditions, as those that were most likely to return a commercial profit, and attention may be directed to certain

well-known words of his as showing how, from the very beginning, Englishmen in India desired to serve an immediate end, and were not actuated by any grandiose imperialistic motives.

> "By my consent," wrote Roe to his employers three hundred years ago, "you shall no way engage yourself but at sea, where you are like to gain as often as to lose. It is the beggaring of the Portugal, notwithstanding his many rich residences and territories, that he keeps soldiers that spend it; yet his garrisons are mean. He never profited by the Indies since he defended them. Observe this well. It hath been also the error of the Dutch, who seek plantation here by the sword. They turn a wonderful stock, they prowl in all places, they possess some of the best; yet their dead pays consume all the gain. Let this be received as a rule, that if you will profit, seek it at sea and in quiet trade; for without controversy it is an error to affect garrisons and land wars in India. . . . You cannot so easy make a fair retreat as an onset; one disaster would either discredit you or interest you in a way of extreme charge and doubtful event. Besides, an action so subject to chance as a war is most unfitly undertaken and with the most hazard when the remoteness of place for supply, succours and counsel subjects to unrecoverable loss; for that where is most uncertainty, remedies should be so much the nearer to occur to all occasions."

Such a policy was practicable and successful so long as there was a power to be dealt with that held a dominant position and that was capable of maintaining order, and it was employed not only towards the Moguls and their viceroys in the seventeenth century, but also by the East India Company in the Chinese Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth. If we compare this early enunciation of policy with the policy of the Indian Government of to-day, the two at first sight appear irreconcilable, but this is rather like comparing the ripe fruit with the tender shoots of a young plant, and in reality the essential continuity and gradual development

of our Imperial policy is nowhere better illustrated than in the history of British India. To trace out the development of the method of pliant submissiveness to strong Asiatic powers for the sake of trade may not be a particularly congenial task for the Englishmen of to-day, but since it was the deliberate policy that was adopted during more than half the time in which Englishmen have been in contact with Asiatics, and since it was, at least, successful in effecting its purpose and in rendering it possible for our merchants to carry on their trade in peace, it is worthy of close study. Down to the middle of the eighteenth century the gains of the East Indian trade were modest, and its importance was far eclipsed by the wealth-producing capacities of other trades, and pre-eminently of that in the tropical products of the West Indies, and it was not until the method had been gradually modified that the Eastern trade began to fill an important place. The change began when Englishmen saw their gains disappearing before the success of their enemies, the French, who had adopted a new method of dealing with the native powers. The break-up of the dominant Mogul power at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the steadily progressive anarchy to which India then became a prey, afforded to the more politically minded French representatives in India opportunities for the acquisition of power from which the conservative and politically timorous English merchants shrank. The chance of dividing the Indian powers one against another, and of utilising political control for the crushing out of their English commercial competitors, was seized with splendid audacity by the French, and it seemed as though

English opportunities for trade were doomed to destruction. But when self-interest has taken English merchants into distant lands, the attack of other powers upon them is not long in arousing our ferocious nationalism, and compels attention to their wrongs from those at home who, while all went well, took little interest in them. The inherent English love of justice and of law and order, under which men can pursue their private ends in peace, is aroused to defend our fellow-countrymen from attack, and our resources for their protection are gradually brought into play. The process by which the British Empire in India was first built up is entirely typical of the building-up of the King's possessions in almost all the tropical parts of the world, and even if only for this reason the history of its earliest stages is deserving of the most detailed study. It began not with any conscious design, but as a consequence of the bitter spirit of trade rivalry between Englishmen and their European competitors. The instinct of self-protection compelled the acquisition of greater interests and responsibilities, but Englishmen never showed eagerness to take more burdens upon their shoulders, they only did so for a direct and immediate purpose. The moment that the pressing danger was removed, they were anxious to return to their tasks and to continue the old policy of peaceful development of their trade. The Directors of the East India Company at home and their servants in India were of one mind in the matter, and only the imperative force of circumstances drove them, despite their reluctance, further and further along the course of Empire.

It was in circumstances such as these that Englishmen

in the eighteenth century began to modify Roe's policy of non-interference in Indian affairs and to take a hand in native politics ; but just as it is a difficult and lengthy process to get Englishmen to embark upon any new course of political conduct, so it is almost impossible to put an end to the persistent exercise of their activity when they have once begun. Clive and his fellows adopted and perfected the methods of their French competitors, and in a few fateful years the French menace in Southern India was removed. During the struggle there was built up a military power that safeguarded the small commercial factories in Madras and Bengal from the surrounding anarchy, and once in existence that power was available to remove a like menace from other centres of trade. The struggle against disorder and misrule for immediate ends of safety and convenience, however, set Britain on a path in which there was no stopping ; before many years had gone by it was evident that the process of stabilising Indian politics under British dominance must go on at a steadily accelerating rate, and the remorseless sequence of events that marked the fifty years before 1783, in the next fifty years made British power paramount over the whole Peninsula south of the Jumna. The culmination of all earlier development in the governorship of Warren Hastings, the last and greatest Governor of the old school, was at one and the same time the inauguration of the governorships of the new. The magnitude of the task of laying down the lines of justice, order and good government for the Indian peoples was realised by no one so much as by him who, thanks to his lifelong experience of the conditions to be dealt with, was

capable of undertaking that task. His predecessors, with the exception of Clive, had looked upon the extension of dominion in India as criminal, and, following the old plans, had maintained that their only business was trade and the pursuit of the arts of peace. Hastings, too, maintained that these were the proper aims of the East India Company, and he and almost all those who have followed him were contemptuous of grandiose dreams of empire and of the lust of power and of conquest; but if in self-protection and the need of good government Britain had to shoulder the burden of dominance, he was willing that she should do so. The methods he adopted were peculiarly and typically British, and, as it seems, they are those on which the whole of the British Empire has been built up. The first and greatest of our pro-consuls had no rigid plan to which he was pedantically determined to adhere; he dealt with events as they arose, and twisted them to fit his broad design, and he was ready to feel for the proper device by constant experiment. In a letter of July 1772, to his friend Barwell, he describes his method for us.

> "It is impossible," says he, "to obtain at once a perfect system of government. We must work as an arithmetician does with his *Rule of False*. We must adopt a plan upon conjecture, try, execute, add and deduct from it till it is brought into a perfect shape. Yet this mode is liable to many inconveniences. It affords scope for the reproach of levity, and the finishing stroke, though the result of all former proceedings, shall bear away all the credit of it, while the troubles attending the first experiment will be charged to the account of the first projectors."

The "troubles attending the first experiments" of Englishmen in the government of an empire are to be studied in the history of the beginnings of British rule

in India, and if we would search for the roots of much that has made our new Empire in Asia and Africa a success, we must search the records of the eighteenth century. The student of Imperial history will find among those masses of almost untouched material a rich mine, in the working of which he may spend his efforts to the profit both of himself and of the cause of knowledge. Not merely will the results of his labours tend to the elucidation of the history of British India, but he will find that India has been almost as much the "mother of dependencies" as has been England herself.

With the extension of British rule over large native populations and its considerable success under those conditions I propose to deal in a subsequent lecture of this course, and I need here say no more than that in this field also English administrators and officials seem to have acquired their experience and to have laid down the broad lines of British policy during the eighteenth century. The dealings of the old Empire with indigenous races were on a much smaller scale than those of the new, but there are many indications that the line of precedents for much of our policy as regards indigenous races derives from the practice of the departments of Indian Affairs in the American and West Indian colonies. Our relations with the negro were tainted by the evil atmosphere of the slave trade, but with other races, like the Moskito Indians of Central America and the Seven Nations of the Illinois country, men were working out the preliminary experiments and discovering how to manage a native protectorate with success. The records of those experiments are lying as yet almost

untouched in the archives of the Board of Trade and Plantations and the papers of the Secretaries of State. They await patient and detailed research on a systematic plan by properly trained students of a school of colonial history, and they will well repay it.

The movements that have pre-eminently distinguished both the old British Empire and the new from all other colonial empires fall within the first of the three forms of colonising activity that were enumerated above, expansion of people of our own race into the void. The establishment in previously unpeopled lands beyond the sea of great and populous communities of the parent stock, with culture and institutions identical in origin and parallel in mode of development with those in the homeland, has been almost the most striking achievement of the British race, and has constituted that "expansion of England," as Seeley called it, that first built up the thirteen colonies of North America, and, when those were gone, began again to build up the five great self-governing dominions.

The transfer of populations of British stock into the void places of the world has never been undertaken as a matter of design; it has always gone on in an entirely spontaneous and individualistic fashion, and throughout the whole of the Empire's history men have been led to emigrate by the desire to find for themselves larger opportunities for the attainment of well-being and happiness than they could hope for among the crowded and rigid conditions of the old country. Since the early years of the seventeenth century the stream of emigration from these shores has never ceased to flow, but the stream has waxed and waned in volume, and with a

single exception it has always been the recurrent pressure of economic unrest and distress at home that has led to any sudden increase of the stream. That exception was, of course, the tremendous secession of Puritan emigrants to the shores of Massachusetts that took place between the years 1630 and 1640, when there was rather a "swarming out" from the body politic than an outgrowth of the commonwealth into new regions. Then, as in the exodus of the United Empire Loyalists from the newly founded United States, the crucial movement that began the new self-governing Empire, men were moved not by individual motives, but by a single-minded devotion to an idea. Their ways of thought were profoundly modified by the breach, as were those of the community they left. It was no longer the same; it had lost much of one of the elements that had gone to make up its character, and from the first a radical difference was thus established between the spirit of the old community and the new. But the new lands of the Empire of to-day have been peopled, bit by bit, by men of all classes and all shades of opinion, who have left their old homes only to advance their personal fortunes; the new community is at first almost a microcosm of the old; differences of habit and ways of thought only develop gradually, and the outlook of the two communities upon the affairs of the outside world remains broadly the same.

Some such considerations may do something to explain the essential differences between the new Empire and the old, a difference that we shall realise if we contrast in turn the New England and the Old England of 1760, and then, say, the Old England and the New

Zealand of to-day. In the one case there was a fundamental difference in outlook, in the other there is a fundamental similarity. Every one of the new dominions has been peopled by individuals who have emigrated to serve their own personal and economic interests and have retained their patriotism undimmed. The New England States and the highlands of Virginia and Carolina, the especial homes of the American revolutionists of 1776, were settled in the one case by English Puritans, and in the other by Scots-Irish, who had left their country not as individual units, but in a body seething with a sense of rankling political injustice and unredressed wrong that rendered them critical of all the actions of the country they had left behind, and at last caused them to take up arms against her.

This fact may appear to tell against the claim for Imperial continuity and to emphasise the differences between the two empires rather than their similarity, but it is, in fact, an essential part of the subject, and a knowledge of it gives a clearer realisation of the matters we are examining. In subsequent lectures it may be possible to show that in institutions and in methods the new is almost everywhere the child of the old, but it is somewhat different in matters of feeling and of culture. Where the eighteenth-century colonies derived from the England of 1640, the self-governing dominions of to-day derive from the very different England of the nineteenth century, and only from one element of the old colonies, the United Empire Loyalists they expelled.

Just as in the story of the extension of British rule in India and other Oriental countries there is one vital thread connecting the whole in the search for self-

protection by the imposition of order and good government, the building up and maintenance of the dykes of firmly organised rule against the raging storms of external anarchy, so in the growth of the white Empire there is to be traced the perennial determination of Englishmen to acquire the power of governing themselves in order and security, and so to satisfy their ancestral right to the ensuring of " the King's peace." The seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries have been periods for the extension of the Empire by the peaceful settlement of our people in lands that were previously almost uninhabited. The eighteenth century was a time of war when the Empire was widely extended after victorious wars, and when in the overcoming of an external menace to our security the colonies of other powers fell into our hands and communities of foreign stock came to be included within the Empire's bounds. But even during this time of war, a time in many respects similar to our own, when in virtue of sea-power the colonies of the conquered fall to the conqueror, the old processes of peaceful expansion were going on, though they may be lost sight of in the more dramatic happenings of the field of war.

Throughout the whole of the last three centuries the same process has been going on ; Englishmen have been passing overseas, and in settling and building up new, stable, self-governing communities on foreign shores have founded fresh centres from which further expansion can go on overland. Every one of these new colonies has its own characteristics, but at the same time its more striking similarities with all other English communities. The British Commonwealth expands

not under the guidance of any centralised body in the parent State, but under the impulses of the individuals that compose it, and thus we have a worldwide process that derives its force not from a single centre but from many centres. There are in the animal world organisms in which the power of propagation is possessed by any group of cells that in a suitable environment is detached from the parent body, and the British Commonwealth somewhat resembles these organisms, but with an added power. Wherever a new community of Englishmen has been established, has been settled in suitable environment, however far removed from the parent commonwealth, it has thriven and grown in likeness to the old, not as a completely separate organism, but as a detached portion of the one great social organism—the British Empire. Whether we look back to the old Empire and note in the seventeenth century the outward growth from Massachusetts of the new colonies of Connecticut, from St. Christopher of the white settlers in Nevis and Antigua, or turn to the eighteenth century and note the outgrowth from Virginia of new communities in the Carolinas or beyond the Alleghanies, the process is seen to be identical with what has gone on in each of the dominions of the new Empire. New South Wales, the parent colony of Australia, has been the mother of daughters in Victoria and Queensland, Cape Colony has given rise to Natal, Ontario has sent forth settlements into the West, and similar movements still go on. Among all the capacities of the British Commonwealth this power of self-propagation stands forth as one of the most striking evidences of its inherent power of continuous political growth.

Whether the current of the national life of an oversea community has derived from the main British stream or only from a branch of it, in each case in order to understand the causes that have guided its course it is necessary that those who attempt to trace it shall not confine their attention too narrowly to their immediate subject. The term "colonial history" has, unfortunately, in the past too frequently connoted what is in reality a different thing, the "history of colonies"; the story of each particular colonial community has been taken up in turn and considered with little reference to the course of events in other colonies, in the United Kingdom or in the world at large. A history of this sort, concerning itself solely with the events in one geographical area, is incapable either of dealing with those events in proper perspective or of explaining the causes that underlie them. The work that is produced will be narrowly parochial in character and cannot in the widest sense be regarded as history at all. A more profitable method for the study of colonial history concerns itself with the progress of general movements in the Empire as a whole, and finds material for its labours in the happenings in any and every dominion and colony in turn; and any one who regards colonial history in this fashion will be met at every turn with the necessity of tracing the story back into the records of the eighteenth century and beyond. The history of the Empire is greater than the sum total of the history of each of its parts, and that history is profoundly worthy of study. I have heard a competent scholar level the reproach at the colonial history of the nineteenth century that it is almost the dullest and most uninspiring

of subjects, as involving nothing but the sordid and wordy warfare of utterly undistinguished politicians about matters of pounds, shillings and pence. The gibe may be true if the subject be only studied in some of the ponderous and dryasdust compendia that have called themselves " histories " of various colonies, but of the real broad subject of Imperial history nothing could be more false. The serious student who conceives the function of history as the description of the development of the environment in which we live, finds abundant matter for his researches, and, whatever lines he may devote himself to tracing out, he will assuredly find that they will lead him back from the new Empire to the story of the old. He will find that, as in the nineteenth century so in the eighteenth, commercial questions and the exploitation of tropical products have had a profound influence on the course of national policy, and it will be necessary for him to know something of the conditions of economic development in Europe if he is to understand and explain the anxiety of the western nations to secure a share of colonial power —whether in the West Indies in the eighteenth century, or in Africa and the Far East in the nineteenth. Much of world policy for the last two hundred years has been governed by the same causes and guided in the same way; it has been the resultant of the interplay of divergent private interests with the reasoned policy of the State. The British State has rarely initiated development, and in most cases in the past our statesmen, almost staggering under the burden of their responsibilities, have done their best to restrain any additions to that burden, but circumstances for two hundred years

have been too strong for them, and the Empire has persisted in growing.

Whether we study the lessons of war or of the gradual extension of the Empire's territory in a time of world peace, whether we look to the development in the King's dominions of institutions and methods of administration, or turn to the economic sphere and examine the movements of population or the progress of British commerce, we find the same lessons enforced again and again upon us.

The present is the child of the past; times change, but the same ancestral traits are there; the British merchant or the British colonist, the administrator or the pioneer, each and every one is the descendant of his forerunner in the past, with wider and riper experience, it is true, but in the way he faces his problems generically the same. To know the bases of the new empire commonwealth we must study the old, and in that study we shall come more and more to realise the truth of all that is involved in what we may with propriety call our Imperial continuity.

II

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE EMPIRE

In attempting to illustrate the continuity of the process of growth in the British Empire, I propose to consider in turn certain of the more important factors in its life, and to take a broad survey of its gradual development from the comparative simplicity of the past to the extreme diversity and complexity of the present age. The first topic that I will deal with is that of administration, the term being used in its widest sense to describe the central system of government whereby the destinies of the outer empire have been guided and swayed from the mother country. We shall be concerned mainly with the colonies inhabited by people of our own stock, for during the period of the old Empire the government of our possessions in India was not the concern of the State, but of the East India Company, and it is best considered in comparison with other trading and colonising companies. It will be impossible in the time at my disposal to say much about the various stages whereby an increasing control over India gradually became vested in the Crown, during the period that elapsed between Clive's victory at Plassey in 1757 and the abolition of the East India Company in 1858. The topic is of great interest, but the general lines of

action are comparatively simple ; they are largely confined to the period of the new Empire, and were governed by many of the same conditions that were worked out in the administration of other dependencies.

In the first lecture of this series it was stated that the extension of the British Empire has been brought about not in the pursuit of any grandiose or imperialistic design, but by men's following up of their own legitimate self-interest, and in the attempt to protect what was already in British possession. In the administration of the Empire, however, when once its outlying parts came under the control of the British Crown, there has been a continual succession of design, or, rather, designs. Each design has been directed to the accomplishment of immediate ends ; there has been no great or logically-thought-out plan to cover all the immense diversities of the Empire in time or space and to bring them into a single and uniform system, but a constant planning of devices, each intended to fit an immediate purpose. Every one of them was but the modification and adaptation of some earlier device, and those that succeeded in their purpose remained as permanent contributions to the structure of the Empire, and were themselves further modified as conditions developed, and were adapted, where circumstances required, to solve the problems of other regions, so that there ultimately came about a broad similarity in the types of organisation over the whole Empire. Thanks to this typically English process of growth, there has never been a complete uniformity of system, such as there was, for example, in the colonial empire of the Dutch. There things were carefully thought out in the ruling councils

of the East and West India Companies, and one type of organisation was adopted throughout the whole of their dominions. Thus if we study the institutions of the Dutch colony at the Cape of Good Hope, we find that, despite the entire diversity of conditions, it was governed in identically the same way and according to the same ordinances as the mercantile factory at Batavia, and if we turn to the easily accessible printed records of the Dutch colony of New Netherland before it became the English New York, we find that report after report of the local officials read like those from the Cape or from Surinam, and that there is a complete similarity of institutions and methods of administration.

With the British colonies it is very different. Owing to the very diverse ways in which the colonies have been brought into being, to the differences in outlook of their founders and to the lack of a definite and fully organised central control, there is an extreme diversity of system within three main groups: royal colonies, proprietary colonies (whether founded by a chartered company or an individual usually non-resident), and co-operative colonies where the settlers govern themselves in virtue of an agreement made between them, and later apply for the grant of a charter. Nearly all of the colonies of the old Empire and many of those of the new began their work in virtue of a charter of privileges granted by the Crown or by some person or body of persons who held a charter from the Crown. The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when our first colonial precedents were established, were a time when feudal theory still held complete sway, though as an economic system feudalism had long been dead. It was held that land

beyond the sea not in the occupation of any Christian prince was in an analogous position to unoccupied waste within the realm of our sovereign lord, the King, in whose power it lay to grant it as from overlord to tenant-in-chief. The grantee, whether a person or a body of persons, held the fief of the Crown, not by military tenure or knight service, which was falling into disuse in England, but by free socage, that is to say, by payment of some money rent and by a legal fiction usually of the principal royal manor of East Greenwich, so that it was sometimes whimsically said that all the colonies lay within the county of Kent. A private individual unprovided with a commission or grant would have had no overlord whose protection he could invoke against the subjects of another power, and would be in the position of a mere pirate without any rights.

The most usual form of charter was the proprietary grant following the long line of feudal precedents from the county palatine in which the vassal held his lands of the King by fealty without payment and enjoyed all rights of government within his borders. No feudal services were to be performed with the occasional exception of homage, but the usual royalty of one-fifth of all mines of gold and silver was to be paid to the Crown. These provisions occur in the early grants of Queen Elizabeth to Gilbert and Raleigh, and were employed with gradual modification in all subsequent grants of proprietaries, like those to Lord Baltimore in Newfoundland and Maryland, to the Earl of Carlisle in the Caribbees, to James, Duke of York, in the province of New York after the Restoration, and so on. Since the proprietors held of the King, and their tenants in the

colonies held of them, the colonists, in passing beyond the sea, did not pass out of the realm, but still remained as subjects of the King, with full allegiance and undiminished rights.

But there was also a form of grant not dissimilar, but deriving from a little more remote ancestry. It had been usual in the Middle Ages for the King to permit certain groups of his subjects to establish themselves in the dominions of a foreign prince beyond the sea for purposes of trade, not as individuals, but in close association in a factory, and there to govern themselves according to the broad provisions of the charter that was granted to them, and with the power of regulating their domestic relations one to another within the limits of the factory. The most important of these factories was that of the Merchants Adventurers in the Low Countries, but there were others, like those of the Eastland Merchants in the Baltic countries, and in Tudor times the factories of the Muscovy Company in Russia and the Turkey Company in the dominions of the Ottoman Sultans. So long as the merchants kept within the limits of their charter they might govern themselves as was found convenient, but they did not depart out of the realm when they passed oversea ; they merely went to a little detached bit of the realm, and still remained subjects of the Crown and amenable to English common law as modified by the local by-laws. The territory of a chartered company partook both of the nature of a proprietary province where the place of the King's tenant-in-chief was taken by a company of persons instead of a lord proprietor, and also of the land in one of the old trading factories. The grantee of the

territory might remain in England, as was the case with the Virginia Company or the Bermuda Company, with Lord Baltimore, the East India Company, or the Hudson Bay Company in the seventeenth century, or the British South Africa Company and the British North Borneo Company in the nineteenth, or it might pass across the sea and thus approach more nearly to the precedent of the Merchants Adventurers, as happened in the case of the Massachusetts Company. Again, the proprietor might grant away a portion of his rights over some of the granted territory by what somewhat resembled subinfeudation, though here the feudal precedents were much weakened. Thus it was the Earl of Warwick who made the grant to the Pilgrim Fathers of the Plymouth Colony, the governor of St. Christopher to the Nevis colonists, and the Massachusetts Company to the men who left the parent colony to found new settlements in Connecticut. But whatever happened the chain was never broken, through whatever links it passed there was never a loss of allegiance, and the colonists always held ultimately from the Crown.

It was found in many cases that the lord proprietor, whether company or individual, got into constant difficulties with the under-tenants, and since the King in the nature of things is always held to guarantee to all his subjects, whether within or beyond the sea, justice and good government, he was merely performing his bounden duty in calling his grantees to account for their actions under his grants, and, when he found that their conditions were not adhered to, in their surrender or in forcibly resuming them by the legal process of *quo*

warranto. The Crown thus returned automatically into direct relations with the colonists, and the granted territory became a royal colony whatever its previous status had been. It was in this way that, on the suppression of the Company in 1623, Virginia came under direct royal control when only one other colony, that of the Bermuda Company, had yet been settled ; Barbados and the rest of the English colonies in the Caribbees became royal colonies immediately after the Restoration by the purchase or relinquishment of the rights of the lord proprietor, the Earl of Carlisle. There was a constant tendency for the colonies thus to come into direct relations with the Crown, just as in the later Middle Ages all the great fiefs fell one by one into the hands of the King. Massachusetts and New York, under Charles II and James II, the lands of the East India Company in 1858, and the territories of the British East Africa Company, the Royal Niger Company and the Hudson Bay Company in the later nineteenth century have all come into the royal hands, and the British South Africa Company, with its territory of Rhodesia, and the British North Borneo Company remain the only Chartered Companies possessing any territorial rights. The Crown, as the sole source of rights, having granted privileges can resume them on compensation of the holders or even without compensation, if the rights are abused. Though throughout the history of the Empire every colony has been started and has grown by reason of a fresh outburst of individual initiative from the parent stock, all rights were derived from one and a single source, the Crown, every train of action leads us back to the same point, and we can realise

how, historically as well as to-day, in practice the keystone of the arch of empire is the executive power of the King-Emperor, no longer, it is true, the personal monarch, but the constitutional wielder of the prerogative acting through definite channels and according to the dictates of a long tradition, but nevertheless the real descendant of the personal monarchy of the Tudors, under whom the expansion of England began.

The England of the first half of the seventeenth century from which the first colonies were peopled was very different in constitutional outlook from the England of the eighteenth century and of to-day. The executive power of the Crown was universally admitted without question to be supreme, and all matters of administration came solely within its purview and did not concern Parliament, save where they impinged upon the traditional rights of the people in matters of liberty and finance. It was not until the revolutionary period of the Long Parliament that it claimed a power of interference with administration, and, as soon as it did so, its unanimity disappeared, and Parliament, as well as nation, was split into contending factions. At first, then, matters of administration in the colonies as much as in England were the affairs of the Crown, and Parliament solely had concern with them where the financial interests of the King's English subjects were concerned; occasionally the charters of colonising companies were submitted for its acquiescence, as were often the grants of other monopolistic trading companies, but only in the same way.

The granting of privileges and the administration of colonies being in the hands of the King, were dealt with

by him through the agency of his ministers, the Lords of the Privy Council. The first device employed for the government of colonial affairs after the assumption of direct royal control over Virginia in 1623, was the usual one of a Commission, such as was, for instance, employed in the administration of the Navy where the matters to be dealt with were too technical for the whole Privy Council, whose hands were filled with an immense mass of detailed administration. Just as a special commission was entrusted with Virginian affairs, so the affairs of New England, then unpeopled but having a valuable commerce in furs and fish, which gave rise to many difficulties, were entrusted to a separate commission, the New England Council, but in neither case was the device a success; the powers of the commissions lapsed after a short time and colonial affairs once more passed into the hands of the undifferentiated Privy Council. It was already, however, becoming the practice of the Privy Council to delegate the preliminary consideration of affairs of a special character to separate committees of its members, and during the reign of Charles I special committees of the Privy Council, assisted by experts —usually merchants of experience—were set up in a somewhat informal way to deal with matters of trade and also with the regulation of colonial affairs, which were closely akin thereto, and, in fact, were intertwined with the general commercial policy of the country in every direction. This business was recognised as falling entirely within the competence of the executive, and though Parliament often objected to details of the action of the Government in such matters as the imposition of customs duties, it could only claim

them to be grievances where they infringed upon the rights of merchants resident in England.

Parliament tacitly acquiesced in the view that the grievances of the King's subjects in the colonies must be petitioned against in their own local assemblies. Just as the King's subjects in Scotland had a Parliament of their own, so might those in Virginia or Barbados have each an assembly where the people or their representatives gathered together under forms modelled on precedent might explain their grievances and take counsel together for their redress at the hands of their sovereign lord, such redress being secured through the actions of the local deputy of the executive power, the governor. Even when all authority was usurped by the Long Parliament, its members do not appear to have claimed any right to interfere with the local autonomy of the colonists, and they seem always to have admitted that the assemblies beyond the sea had concurrent authority with themselves, each in the proper part of the Empire, and as was definitely stated in the charter of Barbados, ratified by the Commonwealth in 1652: "No taxes, customs, loans or excise shall be laid or levy made on any of the inhabitants of this island without their consent in a general assembly." From that date representative assemblies elected by colonists possessing the right of suffrage as fixed by law have been annually elected and called together, who, with the consent of a Legislative Council nominated by the Crown, have uniformly passed laws for the good government of the colony. The assertion by armed force of the control of the ruling clique in England over the colonies was frankly a matter of revolution in pursuit of self-protection against the

setting-up of Royalist naval bases in the colonies, whence a privateering war might be waged against English commerce. The imposition of control was carried out by the Protector, not in the exercise of the old functions of the dispossessed Parliament, but as the holder of the kingly power in commission.

With the Restoration the general course of constitutional development was resumed, and again colonial administration, like the regulation of trade, became solely the affair of the King, and was dealt with by means of his executive agency, the Privy Council. There was for a time a subsidiary and advisory body, the Board of Trade and Plantations, but all effective power was retained by a special committee of the Council, and before long the advisory Board was dissolved, to be re-erected in the time of William III.

At the end of the reign of Charles II we have an empire perhaps more logically planned and with a clearer separation of powers than ever before or since. Supreme over the whole is the King, assisted by his ministers or executive agents, who form a small inner ring within the Privy Council and wield direct executive power in England. The legislative power for the redress of English grievances and those concerning sea trade is vested in Parliament, then, as now, in its Upper House, the highest Court to which all English judicial appeals lie. In Scotland there is the same thing with the same ministers as supreme executive, but there is an entirely different and independent Parliament, and the highest Court of Appeal is entirely Scottish. Ireland is in an anomalous and subordinate position, as will be shown later, but in Jersey there is again the same overlord with

the same inner ring of the Privy Council as executive, though for convenience the King has a special executive officer in the island, his lieutenant-governor; the legislative power in the island lies in its own assembly. So in all the royal colonies, like Barbados, Virginia, and Massachusetts, but owing to difficulty and delay of access here, the immediate executive power is vested in the King's deputy in the colony, his Governor, assisted in the exercise of his functions by his own executive Council. The judicial power in the colony is exercised by the Governor's nominees as exercising a part of the functions of the King, and appeal from their judgments lies to the Crown itself, aided by its own private machinery, the Privy Council, and not by the peculiarly English machinery, the High Court of Parliament.

The period about 1680 saw the most logical and perfect development of the whole system, but even then it was beginning to lose its symmetry. The various parts of the Empire had common interests mostly in matters of trade, where it was sometimes necessary for the King to consult his people and take legislative action. Such consultation always took place by debate in the English Parliament, and the colonies willingly acquiesced in its power to legislate in those commercial matters which were of common interest to the whole Empire. The English House of Commons thus held a predominant position among legislative assemblies, and we can get an illustration of the way in which it regarded its powers by reading the preamble, for instance, to the Navigation Act of 1663—

> "In regard His Majesty's plantations beyond the seas are inhabited and peopled by his subjects of this his kingdom of

England; for the maintaining a greater correspondence and kindness between them and keeping them in a firmer dependence upon it, and rendering them yet more beneficial and advantageous unto it in the further equipment and increase of English shipping and seamen, vent of English woollen and other manufactures and commodities, rendering the navigation to and from the same more safe and cheap, and making this kingdom a staple not only of the commodities of those plantations, but also of the commodities of other countries and places for the supply of them . . . [be it enacted, etc.]."

The plantations were regarded, therefore, not as possessions or landed estates, but as detached parts of the King's dominions, required to play their own part for the general benefit of all the King's subjects.

In the affairs of England the power of Parliament over the executive was steadily growing, and an important controversy in the reign of Charles II showed that in Imperial matters it might also grow by a belittling of the position of colonial assemblies as legislative bodies and placing them in a position of subordination to the King's ministers in a way that had long ceased to be possible for the English Parliament. The controversy concerned the powers of the legislative assembly of the island of Jamaica, and really raged round the question whether that Assembly was co-ordinate with or subordinate to the English Parliament. Did it hold a position analogous to the Scottish Parliament of the time or to the Irish Parliament, fettered as it was by Poyning's Law passed as an Act of the English Parliament in the reign of Henry VII, and therefore unmistakably subordinate.

The question was brought up in an acute form in 1677, and the Council of ministers, in this case assembled as the Lords of the Council of Trade and Planta-

tions, expressed their intentions in no ambiguous way: "Having directed our thoughts towards the consequences and effects which have been produced or may arise from this authority derived unto the said freeholders and planters [*i. e.* the elected Assembly of Jamaica], which we observe to have received a daily increase by the resolutions they have taken less agreeable to your Majesty's intention . . . [we advise] that for the future no legislative assembly be called without your Majesty's special directions . . . [that the Acts to be submitted shall be prepared in England and transmitted to the Governor], that the Governor upon receipt of your Majesty's commands shall then summon an assembly and propose the said laws for their consent, so that the same method in legislative matters be made use of in Jamaica as in Ireland by Poyning's Law."

The question at stake was of fundamental importance, and the Assembly stood up manfully for its rights. The representatives of the people insisted upon their right to tax themselves as they thought fit, and refused to submit to the dictation of the English Government as to the fashion in which the money was to be raised even when they admitted that the revenue was necessary for the defence of the island. Their address to the Governor, in reply to his proposals, shows us something of the principles that were at stake: "We humbly beg your excellency to represent unto his most sacred Majesty the great inconveniences which are likely to redound unto this island by this method and manner of passing of laws which . . . will not only tend to the great discouragement of the present planters, but likewise put a very fatal stop to any further prosecution of

the improvement of this place, there being nothing that invites people more to settle and remove their family and stocks into this remote part of the world than the assurance they have always had of being governed in such manner as that none of their rights should be lost, so long as they were within the dominions of the Kingdom of England. . . . It is no small satisfaction that the people by their representatives have a deliberative power in the making of laws, the negative and barely resolving power being not according to the rights of Englishmen. . . . We hope that . . . his Majesty may be induced to give an instruction to your excellency to pass such laws as are municipal and fit for us and in the same manner which has ever been practised in this island and other his Majesty's colonies." In the end the Assembly successfully vindicated their rights, the obnoxious proposals were dropped, and it was thus demonstrated that all the settled colonies had legislative assemblies that were independent and co-ordinate with the English Parliament.

The only link between the colonies and England was the Crown, which interfered comparatively little in their domestic affairs, and when it did so, exercised its power through the Privy Council or its appropriate committee. In 1696 a permanent Board of Trade and Plantations was set up by Order in Council to advise the Crown about colonial matters and the allied questions of trade, but for many years it never had anything but a subordinate character, and executive functions as before remained in the hands of the Privy Council and the agents most closely associated with the royal power, the two Secretaries of State. Down to the Revolution of

1688 the King's ministers, the supreme executive officers of the whole realm, were both in theory and practice what they were called, the nominees and agents of the monarch. But with the Revolution matters began to undergo a radical change, and ministers became not the nominees of the personal King, but of "the King in Parliament," a very different thing. The preponderant party in Parliament had not merely an influence over the appointment of the principal ministers, but before very long almost the whole say as to the group of men to be appointed. Note, too, that "the King in Parliament" meant the King not in the Jamaica Assembly or in the Virginia House of Burgesses, but the King in the English Parliament, and when this change had come about, the Parliament that had the power to dictate what ministers should be appointed had obviously also the power of effectively criticising the actions of those ministers when appointed. Colonial matters were at first of little interest to English members of Parliament; ministers were allowed to do as they thought best, and neither the importance of the change, nor even the change itself, was realised by the colonists during the first part of the eighteenth century.

All the King's functions with regard to his colonies were discharged nominally *through*, but in reality *by*, his Secretary of State. Of these, the greatest executive officers from the reign of Elizabeth down to the present day, there were in the early part of the eighteenth century two, each endowed with identical powers, in theory being two men holding between them a single office. For practical purposes, however, there was a division of duties, the Secretary for the Northern De-

partment dealing with external affairs relating to the powers of Northern Europe, and the Secretary for the Southern Department dealing with foreign affairs relating to the powers of Southern Europe, but both alike acting in home affairs. The affairs of the colonies were usually in the hands of the Secretary for the Southern Department, who was the more important, and so we find that for a long period all colonial affairs were dealt with by the celebrated Southern Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle. The Board of Trade and Plantations was merely his advisory body, and was little consulted, so that we have to look for the really important papers relating to colonial administration not among its records, but among the much more voluminous and miscellaneous records of the Secretary of State, what are technically known as State Papers, kept in the State Paper Office.

But by the middle of the eighteenth century colonial affairs were becoming much more important and much more interesting, for they were playing a vital part in the great struggle of England and France in North America. Details of colonial administration were much more frequently mentioned in the English House of Commons, and from the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 onwards down to the American Revolution we get a long fight by the House of Commons to make its control over ministers in the exercise of their executive functions concerning the colonies as real as it already was in matters of administration in England. This struggle marks the greatly increased importance of colonial affairs in the life of the old Empire, and the same thing is shown in the many devices adopted by ministers to deal with colonial matters. Down to 1748 the executive

power of the Board of Trade and Plantations was negligible, but in that year the Earl of Halifax, a statesman of the front rank, was appointed to the Presidency, and he devoted himself to an increase in the importance of his functions and to securing the transfer of all matters relating to the colonies from the Secretary of State to the Board. He desired, in fact, to raise the Presidency to the rank of a third Secretaryship of State, and during the period 1752 to 1757 he was successful in gathering power into his own hands out of those of the weaker men who held the Secretaryship. With Pitt's advent to power in 1757 Halifax failed in his further endeavours, and things reverted nearly to their old position, Pitt deciding the steps to be taken in all the important colonies where English and French interests came into conflict, and Halifax's executive power being confined to the details of administration in the colonies that were not so much affected by the war, and where conditions more closely resembled those of peace time. When Halifax retired, in 1761, matters reverted to their old footing, all the functions were again assembled in Pitt's hands, as Secretary of State for the Southern Department, and the Board of Trade and Plantations sank into even greater impotence than before. Its service provided safe and easy unemployment for the sinecurist, and so remained until it was finally abolished by Burke's Sinecure Act in 1782.

All subsequent developments of colonial administration therefore derive from the executive power of the Secretary of State. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Secretary had become definitely in practice the nominee of the party having a majority in the

English House of Commons, and among the many matters that now came to an issue between the colonies and the Mother Country, the greatest principle that was at stake was involved in the question whether the Parliament of Great Britain was the supreme legislative assembly for the whole Empire, or merely the first among many equal assemblies.

That this was the issue was clearly realised in the first period of the struggle, but as time went on and matters drifted nearer and nearer to armed conflict, the clear principle tended to become obscured with other issues, and notably with the struggle that was simultaneously going on between the King and the English people, the last fight in Britain between the ideas of a personal and those of a limited monarchy. The result of the bloodshed of the American Revolutionary war was to settle both controversies in favour of the British House of Commons ; the King of the Empire constitution was proved for all time to be the King in the British Parliament, capable of acting in matters of State only through ministers acceptable to the majority in the House of Commons ; and just as clear an issue was decided in the other struggle—the British Parliament was predominant among the debris of empire that was left after the schism, and had mounted to a position of unassailable supremacy as the *Imperial* Parliament. The successful vindication of their Declaration of Independence by the Thirteen Colonies was followed by a stiffening of control over the remaining colonies, prompted by a determination to prevent them following the evil example. The power of the Executive to control colonial legislatures was extended from matters of

external commerce to domestic concerns, and the passage of Acts of Parliament like the Canadian Constitutional Acts of 1791 and 1840, and the Act for the Abolition of Slavery, marked beyond all possibility of mistake that in practice as well as in theory the position of the Parliament elected by the people of these islands was supreme throughout the Empire.

Never during the period of the new Empire has this supremacy of the Imperial Parliament in theory been abrogated, but in practice what it won after the schism has been, bit by bit, relinquished so far as concerns the territories that we now know as the self-governing Dominions. Though the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament over all the realms of the Crown is in theory still complete, there are few things less likely to happen in the political world than for a party majority in the British House of Commons to legislate in any way concerning the internal affairs of a Dominion. The relinquishment of supremacy at first went on by the series of executive acts that were involved in the granting of Responsible Government, but it was completed and made final by the passing through the Imperial Parliament of the great series of federating Acts of Parliament: the British North America Act of 1867, the Commonwealth of Australia Act of 1900, and the Union of South Africa Act of 1910, where the British Parliament has simply acted in a registering capacity for decisions that had been arrived at by the peoples of the dominions concerned.

But the new Empire does not consist solely of self-governing dominions, there are vast and populous territories for which the legislative powers of the Imperial

Parliament elected by the people of the British Isles are still complete and are repeatedly exercised. There is a good deal of difference, even here, between the way in which the exercise of this power is carried out as compared with the exercise of legislative powers concerning British affairs. Less intimate scrutiny is given to the measures that are proposed; they are largely left to be discussed by experts, if they are discussed at all, but in the great majority of cases they are merely registered at the request of the executive which has had them drawn up by its special expert agency, the Colonial Office, which in practically every case forms its views in concert with the men on the spot.

The Colonial Office, therefore, is still of first-rate importance in the government of the Empire as a whole, and we ought to know something of the way in which it has come into being. With Pitt the whole executive power relating to the colonies was again gathered up into the hands of the Secretaries of State. The final blow to the influence of the Board of Trade and Plantations was given when the Earl of Shelburne was Secretary for the Southern Department in 1766, and the Board was reduced to a purely advisory position, all Colonial governors being directed to send their correspondence to the Secretary of State. In 1768, owing to the extreme pressure of business that arose from the acquisition of Canada and other French territories in North America, a third Secretary of State was appointed, the Secretary of State for the Colonies or for the American Department. Lord Hillsborough, Lord Dartmouth, and Lord George Germaine, who filled the office in succession, held also simultaneously the office

of President of the Board of Trade, and used the machinery of the Board as a branch of their own office. With the loss of the thirteen colonies, the business of government was considerably reduced, and by Burke's Sinecure Act of 1782 the offices, both of the third Secretary and President of the Board of Trade, were abolished, and the two remaining secretaries became Secretaries for Foreign and Home Affairs respectively. The victory of the House of Commons in vindicating its control over colonial affairs was marked by the Home Secretary being entrusted with all matters relating to the colonies. When war became in 1794 one of the principal businesses of the executive, a third Secretary of State was again appointed, this time as Secretary of State for War, and as the West Indian colonies were then exceedingly important strategically, colonial affairs were entrusted to him in 1801, while matters of trade remained in the hands of the Home Secretary until a new Committee of the Privy Council for Trade Affairs was set up, our present Board of Trade. During the long period of peace after 1815 the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies was really more concerned with his growing colonial functions than with the management of the Army, which was largely dealt with by the Commander-in-chief at the Horse Guards, but neither function was regarded as of first-rate importance, the secretaryship being usually conferred upon one of the lesser members of the Cabinet, and the tenure of most of its holders was of brief duration. In 1854, with the outbreak of the Crimean War, the duties of the third Secretary of State became too great for one man to perform, and a fourth secretaryship was set up, leaving the third

charged only with colonial business. In 1858, when India came under the sole control of the Crown, a fifth Secretary, the Secretary of State for India, was appointed, and so matters came into the position in which they now remain.

The direct line of development having thus been traced whereby the successor of one of the principal ministerial agents of the Crown is charged with executive functions concerning the colonies under the critical control of the British Parliament, it now remains to consider in summary fashion the progressive process of differentiation in function that has gone on under the new Empire within his department, the Colonial Office. It was stated a moment ago that the Colonial Secretaryship in the early years of the nineteenth century was regarded as only of secondary importance, and slackness and inefficiency were peculiarly characteristic of the Secretary's subordinates as a somewhat logical consequence. The period has been dubbed by colonial historians the "Mr. Mother-country" period, after a celebrated lampoon attributed to Charles Buller, one of the most earnest colonial reformers of the time. The general disgust felt by colonists at the blundering and self-sufficient ineptitude of the Colonial Office clerks of the time long left rankling memories of "Downing Street" in all the white dominions, but gradually, as time went on, by the granting of responsible government they were largely emancipated from its control and the functions of the office bifurcated in two widely separated directions. On the one hand, as self-government was granted to one colony after another, the Colonial Secretary's position in regard to them ceased

to be those of an administrative official, and he came more nearly to be in the position of a Foreign Secretary charged with delicate diplomatic negotiations with growing nations who, in matters of administration, were in a practical position of independence. The change was finally marked, after the Imperial Conference of 1907, by the foundation within the Colonial Office of a separate Dominions Department, the work of which has become more and more closely associated with that of the new Committee of Imperial Defence, again in essence a Committee of the Privy Council, that fecund mother of committees, and with the permanent secretariat of the Imperial Conference established after its meeting in 1911. The work connected with the self-governing Empire is necessarily much further removed from the control of the British Parliament than is that concerned with the dependent empire, and the Colonial Secretary in dealing with it has returned almost to the position of one of the Stuart Secretaries of State, but now directed in the carrying out of high matters of policy not by a personal monarch, but by the Cabinet, or even, perhaps, the Imperial Conference as a whole. It is impossible for the historian to dogmatise about changes that are going on actually as he writes, and while it would certainly have been wrong to have made the foregoing statement even in the early part of 1916, it is by no means so wrong in the spring of 1917, for we now seem to be witnessing a change wherein the choice of the King's ministers to serve in his Cabinet for Imperial affairs is no longer limited to the indirect nominees of the British Parliament, but may be made in appropriate ways from the whole empire.

The work of the Colonial Office as relates to what are technically called "the Crown Colonies and Places" remains administrative and detailed, and is often carried into effect by means of Acts of the British Parliament, herein acting as a real Imperial legislature. The work has become one of increasing complexity, and often approximates to that performed by the India Office. We may appropriately class it as the work of the undifferentiated Colonial Office, and it will be best dealt with in a later lecture of the course.

III

SEA POWER AND THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE

WHEN in the closing years of the fifteenth century Bartolomeu Diaz and Vasco da Gama sailed round the Cape of Good Hope out into the Eastern seas, and Christopher Columbus found his way across the Atlantic to the shores of a New World, they brought to an end the Middle Ages of Christendom and began a new era. Mediæval Europe had seen almost all its struggles fought out upon the land; its contests, both military and commercial, were waged by peoples who looked inland for the sphere of their activities, and only upon the water of the Midland Sea did states employ sea power to further their desires for wealth and greatness. With the coming of the new age the men of Western Europe faced about to look out over the waters of the ocean in search of power, and those waters which before had marked impassable limits to their activity became the scene whereon the struggles of the nations were to be fought out for three hundred years. Spain, Portugal, England, France and Holland have striven upon the waters of the Atlantic for power and greatness, and when, at the end of the long fight, Britain was left indisputably "mistress of the sea," she had won not only sea power but, what is inextricably bound up with it, the opportunities of empire that are denied to those who fail to hold the ocean.

It was upon the sea that Britain won her old Empire, upon the sea that she saved herself from destruction when that old Empire was snapped in pieces, and it was the supremacy at sea that she won in her fight against Napoleon that gave her peace for the forty critical years during which she was building up her new Empire on sure foundations. The sea has been to Britain not a boundary, as it has been to other powers, but almost a part of her own domain. Along its highways her sons have gone out to the uttermost parts of the world, and over it wealth has poured back to the central mart. To gain the mastery of those highways during the eighteenth century, the century of war, Britain had to fight hard and long, and no Englishman of that century could forget that whether in peace or war by her sea power the British Empire stood or fell. But the nineteenth century was a century of peace upon the ocean, and in peace the sea is free to all. The ubiquity and all-pervasiveness of British sea power was such that its existence was barely remembered, and there were few who recollected that it was the medium apart from which the empire could no more live than it could have grown up. A foreign challenge to Britain's sea power was necessary to wake men from their easy dreams, and to show them that of all the conditions that govern world power those of the sea change least from age to age. The continuity of Imperial history is nowhere more remarkable than in this direction, and I propose in this present lecture to devote my attention to an examination of some of the broader outlines of that continuity.

The great maritime discoveries that marked the change

from the mediæval to the modern age were no isolated phenomena due merely to the genius of one man or even of a group of men. They had been prepared for and led up to by a long series of inventions in the sphere of practical navigation, like the use of the mariner's compass, the construction of properly drawn charts, and the evolution of astronomical methods of calculating position. These inventions were largely the product of Italian genius, and to Genoese sailors, too, were due the improvements in the building of the light Portuguese fishing-craft that made it possible for them to undertake long ocean voyages. Castile and Portugal were ready first of all the western nations to make use of Italian skill, and to them fell the first mastery of the newly explored oceans, and therefore the opportunity of establishing for themselves oversea empires without competition. Spain for many years held an almost unchallenged position which she had taken without fighting, but Portugal, under the lead of her great viceroys Almeida and Albuquerque, had to wage a great naval struggle against the Arab powers who had preceded her before she could hold sway over the whole Indian Ocean and could carry on the development of her empire and her commerce unimpeded. Till after the middle of the sixteenth century the two Iberian nations divided oceanic power between them almost without a rival, and the foundation of colonies beyond the sea by other nations was impossible. France was the first to take up arms to vindicate the freedom of the seas, but owing to her difficulties at home she did not persist in her efforts, though the massacre of her colonists under Villegaignon on the coast of Brazil and

under Ribaut in Florida showed that all attempts at colonisation were impracticable so long as Spain and Portugal held the sea. The vital blow to the Iberian supremacy came from the hands of the sailors of England, but though the defeat of the Armada heralded the sure decline of their dominion, it did not complete it. The slow wane of Spanish power had to go on for nearly twenty years longer before either the English, the French or the Dutch could establish colonies beyond the sea secure from the expectation of Spanish attack. Even as late as 1630 Spain, when she could put forth her strength, still held the command of the Caribbean Sea and could clear out the intruding colonists of other nations, as she did the English and French from St. Christopher in 1629. But her decay was proceeding apace, and when the Dutch could seize and hold with impunity the rich colony of Brazil, Spanish sea power was seen by all to be at an end. Dutch, French and English could sail and colonise in the West Indies almost where they would, with hardly a fear of Spanish reprisals.

For the first seventy years of the seventeenth century we may say that sea power was in abeyance between the English and the Dutch. Neither laid claim, as the Spaniards had done, to world dominion, and, therefore, in times of peace all unoccupied shores lay open for colonisation by any power. This period was, therefore, the great period of colonial beginnings by all the maritime nations, but where a power could establish full control of the sea, the colonising and trading activities of other powers were excluded, and it was thus upon the power of their fleet that the Dutch founded their monopoly of trade in the waters of the Indian Archi-

pelago. The rise of the sea power of the Dutch was extraordinarily rapid and the growth of their commerce was correspondingly great, and since, like the Spaniards, their policy was an exclusive one where it might be, England was hostile to it and determined upon attack. The three Dutch wars were fought out entirely at sea, and are of prime importance in the history of the empire, for though many events in them added little to the glory of English arms, they were finally decided in our favour, and left Britain in a position above all other maritime states, while they convinced her best statesmen of her absolute dependence upon sea power for her empire, her trade and her existence. It was the navy that gave to England the Dutch colony of New Netherland, but perhaps the most important lesson that she learned was the necessity of seizing and holding strategic points upon which the actions of the navy could be based. The operations of the Parliamentary fleet against the Royalist colony of Barbados were directed to the thwarting of Prince Rupert's design of making that island a base for privateering operations against the commerce with the colonies; the seizure of Jamaica in 1655 was designed to give us the command of the Caribbean, and the annexation of St. Helena in 1652 was meant to further the protection of English trade with the East Indies. The period of the Dutch wars saw England's first entry into the Mediterranean, and the acquisition of Tangier from the Portuguese was designed to give us a place of arms whence our sailors might guard our commerce with Leghorn, the ports of Italy and the Levant. The value of Tangier for this purpose was overrated, and when, a few years later, a forward naval

policy was abandoned and retrenchment was undertaken, its forts and harbours were dismantled, and this, our first strategic place in the Mediterranean, was abandoned.

While England was advancing her sea power at the expense of the Dutch, a new competitor was coming to the fore. Louis XIV and his minister, Colbert, were determined to develop French commerce and the French colonies by all the means in their power, and they saw that this could only be done by the strengthening of their fleet. In the war that ended with the Peace of Ryswick in 1697, neither France nor England was strong enough to carry on hostilities beyond the ocean, and it was mutually agreed that the war should be confined to Europe, and that the colonies of each power should remain neutral. The oceanic war was restricted to privateering against commerce, while the fleets were fighting out their battles in the Narrow Seas. English commerce suffered terribly in the conflict, but it ultimately ended in her favour, and her sea power was left in a stronger position to withstand the French menace when the war of the Spanish Succession broke out five years later. She was not sufficiently powerful in this war to undertake great expeditions beyond the sea against the French colonies, but she gained and held the great strategic base of Gibraltar, and when the war ended with France's exhaustion, Britain gained her profit from the war in the colonial sphere. Her claims to Hudson's Bay and Nova Scotia were admitted in the Treaty of Utrecht, and by the firm establishment of her power in the Mediterranean she was placed in a strong position for future struggles. Thanks to her naval strength, Britain was able during the years of peace to develop

the resources of her colonies in security, and to make her West Indian islands the great source of wealth that they remained throughout the century.

The later wars of England and France in the eighteenth century are the classic field wherein have been studied the effects of sea power upon the struggle for oversea empire, and I need here do no more than point to one or two outstanding features of the story. In the war of the Austrian Succession, neither Britain nor France could use the weapon of sea power with complete effect. The English statesmen of the time were neither particularly competent nor particularly lucky in their choice of commanders, but the navy was preserved intact, and at the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle France was forced to give up her conquests, because she had not a strong enough fleet to support them. In the Seven Years War, however, it was shown beyond the possibility of doubt that oversea possessions that are not strong enough to stand alone must fall to the power that, under the shield of a dominant navy, can transport her armies across the sea and keep them supplied. In the years immediately preceding the war, while neither England nor France was supreme in the Indian Ocean, but Mauritius was held in force and a powerful and undefeated French fleet was based upon it, Dupleix could carry on his designs in Southern India with every prospect of success, but when the command of the Indian seas passed to the British fleet the edifice of French power began to crumble at once. Clive's victories, that began the building of our Indian Empire, were based firmly upon the command of the sea, and the guns of Admiral Watson's ships had as real a share in the reduction of Bengal as had the bravery of Clive's sepoys.

It is one of the greatest glories of William Pitt that he not only planned grandiose schemes for the extension of Britain's colonial power, but that he saw the essential condition for the success of his schemes in an unsparing use of sea power. The period of the Seven Years War is always remembered for its victories, but it is more instructive to remember some of its failures and the long and patient tightening of the grip of the British navy upon the ocean before those failures could be turned into success. Pitt realised above all others the blow to British power that had been given by Byng's failure in the Mediterranean and the consequent loss of the naval base of Minorca, and he brought home to his countrymen as no one else had done the pre-eminent rôle that the navy plays in the maintenance of the Empire. Not all his schemes for the use of the navy were well designed, and his abortive attempts to employ the ships in "side-shows" against French ports show us that even the greatest of English war ministers might make mistakes. But his greater plans were sound, and by his support of the long and unspectacular processes of blockade he gradually wore down the naval power of France, his admirals cleared the sea for the secure dispatch of expeditionary forces for the reduction of the French colonies, and one by one they fell to British arms. Senegal was the first in 1758, to be followed a little later by France's stronghold of Louisbourg, guarding Canada at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, Guadeloupe surrendered in May 1759, while Boscawen, Hawke and other admirals held the French fleets wherever they could find them, prevented the despatch of reinforcements to any of the threatened colonies, and kept the seas clear for the transport of English forces wherever they were needed. The

command of the sea was not maintained by great and victorious fleet engagements, but by the long-continued grinding pressure of Hawke's blockade, and it was only after most of the French colonies had fallen, that in his great victory in Quiberon Bay, in November 1759, he could give the finishing stroke and thus ensure that the colonies that had been won with the command of the sea need fear no danger of reconquest. Our American colonists might secure local successes against the enemy, but they were not strong enough to maintain their conquests so long as France could despatch troops and stores in safety. But when once the command of the sea was secure, each part of the Empire could aid the other, British expeditionary forces could do their work, and when Canada fell before the arms of Wolfe upon the Heights of Abraham, a real part of the credit of the victory was due to the men of the blockading squadrons tossing upon the waters of the Bay and the Channel.

As the Seven Years War illustrates for us the right principles to adopt for the full use of sea power, so the War of American Independence illustrates the dangers that arise when those who govern fail to understand its use. Regarded purely from the belligerent point of view, the struggle was an essentially maritime one. Britain, resting content with the prestige she had gained under Pitt, had neglected and starved her navy for the sake of economy, while France, on the other hand, had done all she could to make her fleet efficient. A proper use of British power would have prevented the French from ever sending an army to America to assist the revolted colonists to secure their independence at the point of the bayonet, but the British Government intentionally allowed this to take place under the convoy

of De Grasse's fleet in order to reserve their available naval forces for the re-victualling of the garrison of Gibraltar. Naval strength was frittered away upon secondary objects, and though many creditable actions were fought, they accomplished nothing; French power again began to raise its head in India because of Suffren's victories in the Indian Ocean, and Cornwallis had to surrender at Yorktown because the fleet on which he was dependent could not arrive in face of a superior French force. The decay of Britain's naval power and the loss of the greater part of her old Empire stand in the relation of cause and effect, and it was only owing to her rapid power of recovery and to Rodney's victories over a navy that was seriously weakened by France's financial exhaustion that the West Indian colonies were retained to become the nucleus of the new Empire. Gibraltar was held, thanks to Lord Howe's success in re-victualling it, but the weakening of Britain's sea power raised up for her difficulties in many parts of the globe. The troubles with Spain in regard to the Falkland Islands and her exaggerated claims in the Nootka Sound question to territory upon the Pacific coast would never have been urged if Britain's sea power had been as strong as before; but, luckily, the disasters of the American war had brought forth fresh stores of energy to repair them, the fleet was no longer neglected as it had been, and the mere show of force was sufficient to repel the Spanish claims to our outpost in the Southern Seas, and to preserve the coast that Vancouver had explored, for British occupation and the foundation of the colony of British Columbia when the time was ripe.

The twenty years' struggle against revolutionary France and Napoleon differed from earlier wars in that

the conditions at sea were more favourable to England and she had the opportunity of immensely increasing the lead she had won. Thanks to her command of the sea, which was never seriously jeopardised, she could transport expeditionary forces wherever she thought fit, she could support and carry on great wars for the extension of her Indian Empire without fear of interference, and she could reduce the colonies of her enemies, one after another, at will. Many of these expeditions were muddled and bungled, for it does not follow as a matter of course that the power having the command of the sea necessarily thereby gains the colonies of her enemies; she merely has secured the opportunity of trying to do so, which is denied to those without sea power. The actual conquest of the colonies must be undertaken by land forces for whom the navy simply acts as carrier, and the problem becomes a military one. The Napoleonic war made Britain the heir of every other colonial power; Trinidad was seized from Spain, Mauritius from France, Ceylon, Demerara and the Cape of Good Hope from the Batavian Republic, not to be returned at the Peace, for their strategic position was such as to make them of importance to the supreme naval power. Java had also been captured and held for some years, and if Britain had been urged on to the conquest of oversea territories mainly by greed, she would have retained it as the most valuable of all Holland's colonial possessions. But it had no strategic value, and Britain's ministers saw the greatness of the task that she already bore in India, they shrank from further additions to our responsibilities for the government of Asiatics, and the East Indian islands were returned to the new Orange monarchy in Holland. The

colonies that England retained were naval bases that so long as she maintained her supreme fleet would give her command of the principal trade routes of the world, and she then began the process, which she steadily pursued for many years, of developing strategically situated trading stations that should aid in the furtherance of her oceanic commerce, like Penang and Singapore, Aden and Hong Kong. The destruction of Dutch prestige in Asia by the conquest of Java had an important effect in the Far East, for it broke up their monopoly of the trade with China and Japan, and made it possible for Englishmen to enter fully on that trade with China which added so much to the wealth of the empire in the course of the nineteenth century.

The whole result of the period of war was to leave England in a position to profit more by oversea trade in the subsequent time of peace than any other power. Her position is India was impregnable from any oversea attack, and on the land side there was no European power yet within reach, so that her military strength might be devoted to the task of giving peace to the whole peninsula. The growth of her trade enabled her to shoulder the tremendous burden of debt without fear of any repudiation of her liabilities that would have brought social revolution and have caused her people to break away from the old lines of ordered development of ancient precedents. Britain, securely based upon the sea, could peacefully pursue the well-being of her colonial possessions and the consolidation of her new Empire free from all fear of attack by another power. If the dominion of the sea had been left in the less certain position in which it stood after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, or that of Versailles in 1783, Britain

could never have permitted that freedom of action to her colonists that gradually cleared away all bitter memories and allowed them to develop their national consciousness free from constant interference from the home country. If the colonies had been open to serious attack from the sea it would have been necessary to maintain strong military forces within their borders, and there could never have been that progressive withdrawal of those small British forces that were retained until the colonists were strong enough to cope with all their own local dangers. It was the silent power of the British fleet that in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century saved Australia and New Zealand from being shared with France when her new aspirations for colonial power made her seek for fresh possessions in the unoccupied lands of the southern seas.

The complaisance of England has made her naval supremacy little irksome to other powers. France could take Tahiti and New Caledonia, and Germany Samoa and New Guinea, without protest from Britain, where any other power that has had control of the sea would have attempted to pursue an exclusive policy. The supremacy of the British navy through a hundred years of peace has preserved a real freedom of the sea for all nations, and, thanks to this freedom, all nations have been enabled to enter upon the field of colonial expansion in peace and to the extent that their means would allow. Moderation and the use of sea power not only for the sole benefit of the British Empire, but for the good of all nations alike, has preserved it for a century from challenge, and thus it has come about that the peoples of the world have taken the freedom of the ocean almost for granted, and even Englishmen began

to forget how our empires, new and old, have been based upon the sea, and that without the guardiance of the fleet none of our new dominions could have come into being. To many observers, and especially to the omniscient pedants of a nation that had never learned the lessons of sea power, it was easy to attribute the growth of the British Empire to luck, or to overmastering English greed, and they would deny or depreciate the truth of Raleigh's words : " Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade ; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself."

Even the lessons of the American Civil War were not appreciated, and men failed to see what a tremendous weapon sea power had placed in the hand of the North for exhausting and overcoming the rebel Confederates according to the strictest precedents of blockade laid down in the century of war. For eighty years all the world's wars, save one, were fought out entirely upon land, and fleets were used only for police purposes, for the transport of troops, or as floating batteries for attack upon forts, as in the Crimean War and the bombardment of Alexandria. The inexplicable neglect of the study of the broader aspects of modern history in England, and especially of naval history, covered the lessons of the past in complete oblivion, the domain of imperial strategy was reserved for the teaching of the great continental masters of land war, who knew nothing of oceanic conditions, and the navy was allowed to decline, not merely relatively to the tasks it had to perform, but also absolutely. But as the nineteenth century wore to its close the competition in armaments began to stretch to the sea, and powers that had never had a

fleet began to enter upon large programmes of ship-building.

The awakening to what was at stake came in the early 'nineties from the publication of the epoch-making works of the great American sailor, Admiral Mahan, who based his studies of the influence of sea power upon history, as he was proud to acknowledge, upon the patient researches of Sir John Laughton, for long Professor of Modern History in the University of London. His work brought home to Englishmen with almost a painful shock the fact that though Britain's sea power had been for nearly a century safe from challenge, the conditions under which such a challenge might be made were still there, as ever, while the vulnerability of the new British Empire to attack was even greater than that of the old, if the attack were backed by a sufficient and well-directed naval force. The territory of the empire had been enormously extended, its populations of British stock lived widely dispersed, but united by the sea so long as its highways were kept by the British fleet; the people in these islands had become largely dependent for their food and the raw materials of the manufactures whereby they made their living, upon the cargoes of the ships that, so long as peace should last, could come without hindrance, but which the moment the alarm of war should sound would be even more liable to capture than had been the merchantmen of those eighteenth-century campaigns that Mahan described.

The lessons of the war between China and Japan in 1894, since it was largely fought upon the sea, did much to aid the nation's awakening, and with almost one voice the English people demanded that the naval defences of the empire should be put upon a proper footing,

that all lee-way should be made up, and that the world should be shown unmistakably that British sea power was still unassailably supreme. Mahan's teachings had a profound effect in England, but they had even more influence on the policy of the power that, since its victory over France in 1871, had been secretly planning to seize world power. The German Empire seriously began the acquisition of colonial possessions in the early 'eighties, but so long as Bismarck remained in power, her colonial ambitions were only pursued in a somewhat dilettante way, and apparently rather because the possession of colonies was regarded as the luxury of a first-rate power than with any more deep-seated motive. The accession of an Emperor who announced vigorously that Germany's future lay on the water, and who was a firm believer in Mahan's doctrine, marked a new and very serious departure of policy.

The embarkation of the German Empire on a great policy of shipbuilding that rapidly raised her fleet from a condition of comparative insignificance to a high place among the navies of the world, together with the persistent public agitation that went on with governmental approval for the education of opinion by Navy leagues and societies, began to show the British people that some day or another their supremacy at sea might be challenged, as it had been in the eighteenth century, and we were forcibly reminded, almost in spite of ourselves, of the bases of Imperial power. The possession of a powerful navy by a State that had no reason to apprehend oversea invasion, and whose maritime interests, important as they were, were entirely incommensurate with the strength of its fleet and were in no danger of attack, might not indicate a spirit of aggres-

sion, but, at any rate, it indicated an ability to become an aggressor if the time were propitious. The last years of the nineteenth century did more to show that these views were not groundless. The Spanish-American War of 1898 deprived Spain of the last relics of her colonial power, because her fleet was utterly unable to cope with the superior power of the United States; it pointed the old lesson that colonies must fall to the power that holds control of the sea and that can transport and victual its armies at will, safe from the fear of hostile attack.

The most important indication, however, was given by the steps that led up to the outbreak of war in South Africa. Germany had begun her colonial career in South-west Africa almost at the nadir of British power and prestige in the sub-continent. She had expended great sums of money in trying to build up a colony by artificial means, had accumulated there considerable military equipment, and while in apparently complete friendship with Great Britain had done all she could to cultivate relations with the Boer republics of the Transvaal and the Free State, which were desirous of getting rid of even the shadowy links that bound them to the British Empire. It would be foreign to my purpose to enter here into the story of those intrigues, and I am not sure that even yet they can be properly told, but the celebrated telegram from the Emperor William to President Kruger marked a readiness to find profit for Germany in Britain's difficulties, and the tremendous agitation that was engineered against our conduct of the war pointed in the same direction. There is little doubt that had Germany had a free hand, or could she have found allies in the adventure, the

British Empire would have been faced in 1899 with the same problems that she had failed to deal with a hundred and twenty years before. But circumstances were not the same. The prestige of the British navy stood higher in 1899 than in 1779, and where before had been neglect and corruption was now the highest degree of skill and vigour. The German navy could by no means be compared with the fine fighting force of Old France, the heart of Germany's rulers failed them, and Britain fought out her land war unmolested and never had to fire a shot at sea. Both countries learned the lesson beyond mistake, the continuity of history was triumphantly vindicated, and Germany set herself to work to reduce Britain's lead by the building of a fleet under her successive Navy Laws that should be not uncomparable in strength with that of the strongest naval power.

The ten or twelve years that followed the South African War will be memorable as the time when the subjects of the King beyond the sea for the first time really began to see how all their life and prosperity was built upon sea power, and how they had as vital an interest in the Navy as had the people of the United Kingdom. The unfamiliarity of the Dominions with sea power is no reflection upon them, for it requires a good deal of imagination for a man born and bred in Winnipeg, who has never seen the sea, to realise that a good deal of his fate may depend upon the issue of a battle fought, say, among the fogs of the North Sea. Defence, to most colonists, was a local affair dependent upon the action of militia troops aided by a few battalions of professional British soldiers against undisciplined native hordes. The support and manning of the navy in the new Empire, as in the old, was entirely a matter

for the people of the United Kingdom, as was the conduct of the campaigns that were fought on the North-west frontier of India, the only land frontier of the empire save one. The long land frontier of Canada needed not a soldier from end to end, and military operations meant little more than matters of police. Every Englishman is familiar with the sea, he knows many sailors, and pride in the navy has been bred in his bone for generations. He has little difficulty in realising the need for sea power if he is not misled by his leaders, and he is, therefore, in a much easier position than many of his fellow subjects in the Dominions. The new lessons of sea power first came home to the island peoples of the Dominions, for they, being separated by blue water from all other peoples, could realise most clearly how the continuance of their peaceful development was entirely dependent on the freedom of the seas under the one power that by her exercise of undisputed sea power for a century had shown that she could be trusted to use it properly, and not to abuse it for her own selfish interests.

Newfoundland, which lives by the sea, has always taken her share in the manning of the navy; New Zealand, an island home, soon showed her eagerness to make her contribution, while the Australian colonies, that till recent years have only been linked together by sea communications, as one of the earliest acts of their newly founded Commonwealth began to establish a Royal Australian Navy of their own as a contribution to the common defence. Cape Colony, too, has done what she could, though with the menace of a military power upon her land frontiers she might have been excused had she not seen all the implications of sea power.

Canada depends less upon the sea and more upon the innumerable land communications that link her with her great neighbour to the south than any other part of the empire, and she was thus the last of the self-governing nations to take the great new step forward and to get ready to shoulder her part of the burden of Imperial naval defence.

The Imperial Conference of 1911 saw for the first time the Dominions taken into full counsel in the matter of defence by the Imperial Government. The military aid that had been given by the Dominions in the South African War showed that on that side a new precedent had been created. With the exception of some aid rendered in the wars in Egypt, neither in the new Empire nor in the old had colonial troops taken part in other than their own local struggles, but in South Africa men from Canada, Australia and New Zealand came to fight in the general defence of the empire, and it was clear that the burden of that defence no longer rested, as it had done for three hundred years, on the people of the United Kingdom alone. The Indian Army was not employed in that struggle, but a similar precedent had been set at an earlier date when Indian troops were brought to Malta for general Imperial purposes. The debates that followed the Defence Conference of 1911 in political circles throughout the empire were of infinite value in bringing home, not only to the white subjects of the King-Emperor, but also to many of his Asiatic people, the essential truth that the problems of Imperial defence are one. Men realised the conditions that safeguarded all our empire's life, and which were summed up three hundred years ago by a master thinker for the realm of

his day: "Thus much is certain," wrote Bacon in his Essay on the True Greatness of Kingdoms; "he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much and as little of the war as he will. Whereas those that be strongest by land are many times, nevertheless, in great straits. Surely at this day with us of Europe the vantage of strength at sea, which is one of the principal dowries of this kingdom of Great Britain, is great: both because most of the kingdoms of Europe are not merely inland, but girt with the sea most part of their compass, and because the wealth of both Indies seems in great part but accessory to the command of the seas."

We have here not only a crucial maxim for our people, but when it is interpreted in the light of history as applicable to the whole empire into which the England of Bacon's day has grown, it may do much to convince us of the continuity in space and time of our Imperial expansion and of the sea power upon which it has been based.

I have devoted almost all the time at my disposal to a consideration of this, the essential condition of our Imperial defence, because, as it seems to me, throughout our history military power and its exercise have always been successive to the establishment and maintenance of naval power. Even to-day, when we see armies of millions of our fellow subjects from all parts of the empire battling for freedom upon the fields of Europe, the truth of this statement cannot be denied, but we are driven to ask ourselves a question to which, I fear, it is impossible as yet to find a satisfactory answer. Throughout the Middle Ages land power was supreme and sea power played only a comparatively subsidiary

part; the principal trading routes of the world were overland, and all traffic by sea was precarious and uncertain. Improvements in the arts of navigation and shipbuilding brought a change, and throughout the modern age sea power has been the more important factor in world history; the great trade routes have all been over-sea, and wealth has poured into the coffers of the maritime nations. But we are now at the opening of a new age wherein improvements in the means of transport have made land travel quicker and safer than sea travel. Are we destined to see land power once more predominant over sea power or is it not more likely that there will be equilibrium between the two, and that strength will lie with those peoples that can combine them both? Two great land routes have been completed within the last fifty years: those railways that cross the American continent from the west to the far west and the Trans-Siberian railway to the far east; two more are approaching completion: the Cape to Cairo railway and the railway route to the middle east and India. Two of these routes run through territories belonging to the British Empire, and of the last, and perhaps the most important, one through the middle of the Old World, Britain holds securely the further end. In the great struggle for sea power and oceanic commerce Britain has played the foremost part; in the economic struggle of the future she will start with many advantages both on land and sea. May not the peoples of the British Empire, with their superabundant stores of energy, initiative and determination, be destined to fill at least as important a part in the future development of the land routes of the new age as they have done upon the sea routes of the past and present?

IV

IMPERIAL TRADE

It cannot be complained that the historians of the older Empire have neglected the vital part that was played by questions of trade in its foundation and upbuilding, and it would rather be truer to say that they have had a tendency to attach undue weight to the constant economic discussions and the repeated enactments upon the commercial relations between the colonies and the mother country, and thus to lose sight of many factors of at least equal importance in the life of the empire. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the systematic regulation of commerce played an exceedingly important part in all colonial affairs in the later half of the seventeenth and the whole of the eighteenth century; but a great reaction took place after the granting of responsible government, and it became the fashion to think of the colonies in connection with any matters rather than with their trade. The extreme policy of *laisser faire* that was adopted in the 'forties of the nineteenth century with regard to the trade of the Empire after the repeal of the Navigation Acts and the practical abolition of Customs duties in Great Britain appeared to involve an entire breach of continuity with the past, and it seemed as though the

introduction of the policy of Free Trade made all the precedents of the old Colonial System for ever obsolete. But looking back now we can see that the old system of excessive commercial regulation and the nineteenth-century system of almost entire abandonment of regulation form in reality the complementary parts, the crest and the trough, of one great wave in the history of the Empire, and that, despite the claims of their extreme advocates, neither system was the sort of heaven-sent revelation suitable for the circumstances of all time that they supposed it to be.

The thread of historic continuity in the economic life of the Empire certainly wore very thin in the days of the ascendancy of the Manchester School, but, thanks to the many other less material strands binding the colonies to the mother country, it has never been snapped, and the history of the old Empire is nowhere fuller of lessons and warnings for us to-day than in those chapters of it that deal with trade regulation, with tariffs, and with the laws relating to shipping. There are only a limited number of weapons at the disposal of the economic reformer, and in no field is there more temptation to believe that any device that is adopted is bound to be a perfect remedy for the economic ills it is intended to cure, and to forget the instances in history where a similar device has resulted rather in harm than in good. The doctrines of the economist are adhered to with a fervour that is elsewhere met with only in the theological sphere, and the supporters of rival theories are often as intolerant of one another as any bigots can be. The lessons of history to those of us who cannot claim to have received the full

economic inspiration would appear to indicate that in the sphere of commercial regulation, as in most others, circumstances alter cases, and what is the best course to adopt in one country and one age is by no means bound to prove so in another and for all time. But, unfortunately, whatever plan of commercial regulation or commercial licence is adopted will certainly fill some pockets and empty others, and there will always, therefore, be vested interests to shout at the top of their voices for and against it. The trading classes in every modern community, having all wealth-producing machinery at their disposal, have always very great weight in the national councils, and whenever questions of trade and industry come up for decision have always a tendency to shoulder aside as visionary amateurs those who, not being " business men " in the least pleasant sense of the term, prefer " commonwealth " to wealth. This trait has been noticeable all through the modern age of English history, and especially so in the relations between the mother country and the colonies, which, till the middle of the nineteenth century, were mainly valued for their trade, and were expected to return dividends like any other commercial speculation. But, as in the political realm we have come in recent years to look at the colonies in a truer light, so in the economic realm we have come to see that the getting of riches is not the only aim, and that Imperial well-being is a higher goal than the filling of the money-bags of the trading classes.

The first expansion of English activities beyond the sea came about in pursuit of gain in the channels of mercantile enterprise, and the history of this expansion

dates back far beyond the story of the formation of extra-European colonies, and leads us back to the establishment of English staples in the great trading centres of the Low Countries, on the shores of the Baltic and in the ports of the Scandinavian countries in the Middle Ages. For the genesis of the English chartered companies, which have played such an important part in the building of the British Empire, we must look to the later years of the fourteenth century, when English merchants began to throw off the yoke of the Italians and the Hanseatic merchants, who had previously almost monopolised our foreign trade. The charters granted by Henry IV to the Merchant Adventurers and to the Eastland Company for the establishment of self-governing factories in foreign parts are the first precedents in the long line of royal grants to chartered companies, and it was in the support of their privileges and during the long two centuries' struggle of England to relegate foreign enterprise to a subordinate position and to become mistress of her own trade, that the policies of commercial regulation were worked out that had such an important influence on later history. It was during the period between 1399 and 1600 that England was converted from a rather backward agricultural country, exporting only raw materials, into one that had large exports of manufactured goods, and during the same time, but especially during the last fifty years of it, England gradually built up a mercantile marine that could not only carry all her trade with European countries, but was ready to seek for opportunities of trade much further afield. The system of commercial regulation was slowly improved in the long

struggle against the merchants of other nations for commercial autonomy, and England owes much to her Tudor monarchs for their skilful generalship in the struggle. Our English rulers differed from those of Portugal, Spain and France in preferring to make their profit out of the commercial enterprises of their subjects, not by investing capital in those enterprises, but by taking toll through their customs on all goods exported from or imported into the realm. Since a large proportion of their revenue was derived from these customs, it was necessary that the rulers should see that they were efficiently collected and that duties were laid upon goods to the best advantage. Constant care and attendance was bestowed by the Tudors on these matters, and the Customs system, that lasted right onwards till the reforms of Huskisson and Peel in the nineteenth century, was that founded by the statesmen of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries to replace the mediæval system of customs dues that had almost all been levied on the export of raw materials.

The new system of duties was not only designed by the Tudors and modified and perfected by the Stuarts with the end of producing revenue, but it was also protective and planned so as to encourage the progress of English manufactures and the sale of those manufactures beyond the sea. Two other devices were combined with the protective tariff for the same ends. The long series of English Navigation Laws had its rudimentary beginnings in the reign of Richard II, and was designed to make it easier for English merchants than for merchant strangers to make a profit in goods imported into this country, while, on the other hand,

the regulations of the oversea trading companies were designed to further the sale of good English manufactures in foreign parts, and to ensure the conduct of the trade not only for the private profit of the merchants, but also for the national benefit. In their earliest forms neither the Navigation Laws nor the regulated company of merchants could secure very great results, owing to their imperfections and to the inability of the weak central authority of the State to enforce its regulations with any degree of completeness ; but with the gradual improvement in the machinery of local administration under the Tudors, and the establishment of really efficient governmental control, it became possible to enforce whatever regulations were made concerning shipping, and to convert the Navigation Laws into an effective weapon which Queen Elizabeth's great minister, Burghley, wielded with ruthless vigour to secure the final victory for England in the long fight against the Hansa. From Burghley's time onwards there was no object to which successive ministers of the Crown gave more anxious care and attention than to the fostering of the trade and commerce of the nation, and the reigns of the first two Stuarts were peculiarly a time of economic investigation and careful scientific study of ways and means. At no period have the writings of economic theorists, who were at the same time practical merchants, been more carefully studied by the country's rulers, and the inaccurate character of some of their conclusions should not blind us to the admirable pioneer work that they did.

The old device of the regulated Company for foreign trade, where each merchant traded for his own profit

according to the regulations laid down for the whole body, was gradually abandoned in favour of a better instrument, and the new trades set up under Elizabeth were worked upon a closer form of co-operation in the joint-stock company, to the capital of which merchants subscribed definite amounts in ships, goods or money, and from whose profits, when realised, they drew periodic dividends. It was the gradual perfecting of this device under the Stuarts that gave personal initiative its opportunities in founding colonies and searching for new trades, and to the successful use of it the first foundation of our oversea Empire is due. There was a continual struggle on the part of merchants who were not free of the companies to secure a share of the profits without contributing to the burdens that were borne by the Company in order to ensure the satisfactory establishment and maintenance of the trade, and the constant attacks of these interlopers or "free-traders," to use the term of the time, upon the exclusive privileges or monopolies of the Companies, were a persistent spur to them to administer their privileges well and efficiently. The "free-traders" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had nothing in common with the Free Traders of the nineteenth. They had no objection to the system of Protection of home industries, but they fought against the system of monopoly trading by privileged companies, and desired to secure for themselves a share in those privileges without incurring a share of the obligations which those privileges involved. Their attacks almost always in the long run ended in the absorption of the malcontents into the company whose privilege they attacked; there was

a constant infusion of new blood into the ranks of the privileged merchants, and there was never in the British Empire, what there was in other countries, a gradual gathering of all commercial privileges into the hands of one or two close corporations. The English State played its part in the process by holding the balance even between the competing interests, and by taking its toll through the Customs indiscriminately both from the privileged Companies and from the free-traders. As the administrative machine was perfected, so it became possible to enforce impartially for the benefit of all Englishmen the laws of navigation that at an earlier date had been more honoured in the breach than in the observance.

The culmination of the work that had been done by Burghley came with the Navigation Ordinance of 1651, whereby the Government of Cromwell, dowered as it was with despotic power, was enabled to enforce the protective policy of its predecessors and to hand on to the Government of the Restoration a system of trade management that was extremely efficient, so far as England was concerned. By a series of legislative enactments between 1660 and the end of the century, the system was perfected and thoroughly enforced in English ports, to the great benefit of our commerce and the complete victory of English merchants over their Dutch competitors.

I showed in an earlier lecture how the period of the Dutch Wars gave England her first victory in the struggle for sea power, and thus made it possible for her to maintain and develop her oversea Empire. The struggle was intimately bound up with the economic

struggle, and the victory that England secured was of as great an importance in the material life of the Empire as in its political life, though the commercial struggle with the Dutch began earlier and lasted longer than did the naval struggle. The English policy of commercial regulation was much more flexible and gave much greater room for the exercise of individual initiative than did the more rigid and exclusive system of the Dutch. England had many advantages, for she was a great manufacturing as well as a great trading nation, and since the State had other sources of wealth than those derived from trade, she could survive financial disasters to her merchants much better than could her Dutch rival. While the struggle went on, her pioneers were gradually founding plantations beyond the sea, where raw materials were produced that she could not raise for herself. Her system of commercial regulation and protection was being perfected while her colonies were being founded, and the processes went on in unison and often under the work of the same individuals in the Board or Committee of Trade and Plantations. It would have been entirely strange to them to regard the colonies as anything other than detached communities of Englishmen across the sea, so that the whole Commercial System was automatically and insensibly expanded to cover the whole Empire.

The practical economists of the Restoration period had an enormous influence upon the policy of the State, and having the advantage of nearly a hundred years' study of commercial theory to work upon, they were able to formulate logical plans for the complementary development of the various parts of the empire that,

for rounded completeness, cannot be surpassed, even at the present day. If we read, for example, the works of one of the practical writers, like Childs, in the late seventeenth century, we cannot sum up his aims better than in words like these: "The establishment of a consolidated and self-contained empire based on reciprocal and preferential duties. To free the British Empire from economic dependence on foreign countries . . . [and to] stimulate the production of food-stuffs, cotton, sugar, palm products, and other essential raw materials, and to protect and give every encouragement to the Imperial Mercantile Marine"—words extracted from the programme of a propagandist league published in the newspapers in the month of February, 1917.

By a judicious system of legislative enactment the statesmen of the Restoration designed that while the mother country should provide the refined manufactures for the whole empire, the tropical plantations should direct their attention to the raising of the great staple products like sugar, and should be supplied with labour from our African factories, and with the foodstuffs they required for their sustenance from the temperate farming communities of the northern colonies, who would also find employment in producing the naval stores that were requisite for the English navy that guarded and protected the commerce of them all. The empire would thus be self-sufficing, and could obtain all the commodities it needed from within its own borders. Customs duties were levied in one part of the empire upon the products of other parts, but they were always lower in rate than those charged upon goods brought from foreign countries, and there was thus evolved upon

paper a complete system of Imperial preference designed upon the most scientific lines that were possible to the best economists of the time. Just as the Reconstruction period of the late seventeenth century saw in action the most logical system of Imperial administration that England has ever had, so it saw also the most logical statement of a system of Imperial preference which commended itself to almost universal acceptance for a whole century. The action of the system was expounded in numberless writings during its predominance, but by no one so well as by the fairest and yet the severest of its critics, Adam Smith, who, in a celebrated passage in his *Wealth of Nations*, sets it forth as a gigantic system of national shopkeeping.

"To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers may, at first sight, appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose government is influenced by shopkeepers. . . . England purchased for some of her subjects, who found themselves uneasy at home, a great estate in a distant country. The price, indeed, was very small . . . and amounted to little more than the expense of the different equipments which made the first discovery, reconnoitred the coast and took a fictitious possession of the country. The land was good and of great extent, and the cultivators, having plenty of good ground to work upon, and being for some time at liberty to sell their produce where they pleased, became, in the course of little more than thirty or forty years (between 1620 and 1660), so numerous and thriving a people that the shopkeepers

and other traders of England wished to secure to themselves the monopoly of their custom. Without pretending, therefore, that they had paid any part either of the original purchase money or of the subsequent expense of improvement, they petitioned the parliament that the cultivators of America might for the future be confirmed to their shop; first, for the buying all the goods which they wanted from Europe; and, secondly, for selling all such parts of their own produce as those traders might find it convenient to buy."

The quotation of a single passage such as this might lead us to acquiesce in the view held by some of the doctrinaire economists of the nineteenth century, that the old colonial system was narrowly and selfishly designed for the sole benefit of English merchants and manufacturers, but this does less than justice to our ancestors. The ideal of a self-sufficing empire was certainly applied with a selfish bias by British ministers, but it was common to all the Western nations, and was striven after by other colonial powers with far less consideration for the interests of their subjects oversea, and a far greater greed for the profit of the trading and governing classes at home. Adam Smith's strictures upon ill-applied systems of commercial regulation were directed against all such systems and not especially against the English system. He showed in many passages how that system was infinitely more liberal and less selfish than the systems of other colonising powers, and his work is rather a testimonial to those who had founded and governed the old British Empire than an unrelieved criticism against them.

Colonial imports enjoyed highly preferential rates

in England, and large bounties were given from the Exchequer to stimulate such colonial industries as would enable England to avoid having recourse to foreign countries for their purchase. Societies were founded in the eighteenth century to encourage colonial arts and commerce, and the production of numberless commodities from indigo and cochineal to wines and silks were fostered by every means at the Government's disposal. Designs such as these were the principal preoccupation of the government in colonial affairs in the first half of the century, and we must acknowledge that the colonial policy of this country was far more altruistic and liberal in every way than the contemporary policy of other nations, and it even compares favourably with the way in which the colonial possessions of certain powers are dealt with to-day. There was a general acquiescence of the colonists in the value of the system, and some of them believed in an even more restrictive system for the general good of the self-sufficing empire. Such an attitude is only natural when we consider the truth of a statement made by Edmund Burke: "The act of navigation attended the colonies from their infancy, grew with their growth, and strengthened with their strength. They were confirmed in obedience to it even more by usage than by law."

But there were certain sections in the colonies of New England who made their living by regular evasions of the Navigation Laws, and by trading with the islands in the French and English West Indies regardless of all regulations, even of those which we should nowadays consider absolutely necessary for the protection of the revenue. With the period of reconstruction after the

Seven Years War, the Home Government attempted to clean up the corruption and the slackness that had attended the enforcement of the Acts and to stop up the leaks that made the collection of customs duties in the colonies more costly than remunerative. The methods they adopted were ill-advised, and since they were contemporary with what the colonists considered to be attacks upon their indefeasible political rights, the objections to the harsh methods of the Government's employees focussed antagonism to the whole commercial system.

The break-up of the empire in 1783 harmed the seceding colonies even more than those that remained loyal, and they were left in a state of economic chaos until, in pursuance of mutual interests, and especially those of the West Indian plantations, the British Government readmitted the United States to commercial intercourse. But the break-up of the empire did not involve the abandonment of the commercial system, and it was, in fact, more closely applied and more efficiently regulated than before. The payment of bounties on certain exports from the colonies, which had been one of the main expedients in the middle of the eighteenth century, was abandoned, but the system of colonial preference was much extended. Colonial products were admitted into the United Kingdom at rates much below those on foreign products, and by the enactment of the British Parliament home products received a like preference in colonial markets. The duties against foreign commodities were so high as to be practically prohibitory, but the revenue secured upon English goods in the colonies was not reserved for

Imperial purposes, but was paid over, after the cost of collection by Imperial officials had been deducted, to the funds of the colonies in which they were collected. The system was exceedingly complex and unscientifically administered. It contained extraordinary anomalies that had grown up in the long course of its operation, and the constant tinkering with the duties that went on under the pressure of the various interests at stake resulted in making these anomalies worse instead of better, and colonial preference certainly did more harm to the general interests of Imperial trade than it did good to the colonies. It was, therefore, peculiarly liable to attack by those who were influenced by Adam Smith's teaching and who, without his broad and statesmanlike view of the question, urged that Britain should cut away all the anomalies of the colonial system and the colonies themselves in order to save expense in maintaining them, and to be able to make more profit by trading with foreign countries. The crude views of the advocates of this scheme were really narrower and more designed to serve the selfish ends of the mother country than any that were urged by the supporters of the preferential system. Writing in 1835, Richard Cobden put these views in their most uncompromising form—

"We have been planting and supporting and governing countries upon all degrees of habitable, and some that are not habitable, latitudes of the earth's surface; and so grateful to our national pride has been the spectacle that we have never for once paused to inquire if our interests were advanced by so much nominal greatness. Three hundred millions of debt have been

accumulated—millions of direct taxation are annually levied—restrictions and prohibitions are imposed upon our trade in all quarters of the world for the acquisition or maintenance of colonial possessions; and all for what? That we may repeat the fatal Spanish proverb: "The sun never sets on the King of England's dominions." For we believe that no candid investigator of our colonial policy will draw the conclusion that we have derived, or shall derive, from it advantages that can compensate for these formidable sacrifices. . . . "If we no longer offer the exclusive privileges of our market to the West Indians, we shall cease, as a matter of justice and necessity, to compel them to purchase exclusively from us. They will be at liberty, in short, to buy wherever they can buy goods cheapest, and to sell in the dearest market. They must be placed in the very same predicament as if they were not a part of his Majesty's dominions. Where, then, will be the semblance of a plea for putting ourselves to the expense of governing and defending such countries?"

Adam Smith had urged his views in a sound and realistic manner, but some of those who claimed him for their own indulged in vain imaginings that vitiated a great part of what they wrote. They stated that it was better to increase the purchasing power of foreign countries rather than of our colonies, for we had no expense of maintaining foreign governments while we had to support colonial governments at the expense of the British taxpayer. No appeal to other considerations than mere finance could be justified, for according to these enthusiasts the reign of perpetual peace was now assured, no foreign country would ever dream again of

attacking the British Empire, and those who maintained the contrary and desired to keep up still an army and a navy were simply desirous of bolstering up their own interests and preventing the arrival of the millennium of the trading classes, who would engage in a delirious round of buying cheap and selling dear.

Luckily for the future of the Empire, the extreme views of the advocates of a policy such as this had no chance of acceptance, and the statesman to whom the adoption of Free Trade was due expressed sentiments corresponding much more closely with reality and in terms worthy of remembrance: "If you look properly at the relations between yourselves and the colonies," said Sir Robert Peel, "you must consider your colonies entitled to be put on a different footing from foreign countries, and that it is perfectly fair to give to articles of colonial production a preference in your markets over articles the produce of foreign countries. I am disposed to think even that you ought to carry the principle of assimilation, if you can, so far as to consider the colonies an integral part of the Empire for all commercial purposes."

Peel seemed to contemplate the retention of all the commercial relations of the colonies within the competence of the Imperial Parliament, and the same assumption was made by the Earl of Durham in his Report on Canada in 1839. He laid it down that while it cannot be desirable that we should interfere with the internal legislation of the colonies in matters which do not affect their relations with the mother country, there are certain matters in which the Imperial Parliament must necessarily retain control. "The

constitution of the form of government—the regulation of foreign relations and of trade with the mother country, the other British colonies and foreign nations—and the disposal of the public lands, are the only points on which the mother country requires a control. This control is now sufficiently secured by the authority of the Imperial Legislature ; by the protection which the colony derives from us against foreign enemies ; by the beneficial terms which our laws secure to its trade and by its share of the reciprocal benefits which would be conferred by a wise system of colonisation. A perfect subordination on the part of the colony on these points is secured by the advantages which it finds in the continuance of its connection with the empire."

The actual course adopted was of a dual character corresponding to the bifurcation of the empire in the second half of the nineteenth century into self-governing dominions and Crown colonies. With regard to the second of these a modified system of regulation of their commercial relations has been retained by the Imperial Government, though the practice has been more closely assimilated to that adopted for India in the last years of the Commercial System than to that then employed for the North American colonies. The Imperial Government there had complete control of the duties upon imports, but the tariff was only adapted to revenue-producing purposes, and in hardly any case was there any differential duty for the purpose of protecting British manufactures. The control of the Imperial Government has been retained, only small revenue-producing tariffs are imposed, and there is no preference either to the products of those territories in the home markets

or to the manufactures of the United Kingdom in the colonies.

With the self-governing dominions a different policy has been adopted something akin to that laid down by Adam Smith in a passage exhibiting to the full his political acumen. "To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily give up all authority over her colonies and leave them to elect their own magistrates, to enact their own laws and to make peace and war as they thought proper, would be to propose such a measure as never was and never will be adopted by any nation in the world. . . . If it was adopted, however, Great Britain would not only be immediately freed from the whole annual expense of the peace establishment of the colonies, but might settle with them such a treaty of commerce as would effectually secure to her a free trade, more advantageous to the great body of her people, though less so to the merchants, than the monopoly which she at present [*circa* 1770] enjoys. . . . [This would dispose the colonies] to favour us in war as well as in trade, and instead of turbulent and factious subjects to become our most faithful, affectionate and generous allies; and the same sort of parental affection on the one side, and filial respect on the other, might revive between Great Britain and the colonies which used to subsist between the colonies of ancient Greece and the mother city from which they descended." The writer of this passage assumed that the colonies would pass completely into the position of foreign states, but the same result was obtained without any such breach.

From about 1850 onwards the self-governing colonies

have been entirely free from Imperial control in matters of trade, and have been able to conclude commercial treaties of their own with foreign powers regardless of the policy of the mother country, but this has been found entirely compatible with the retention and deepening of the allegiance they owe to the Crown and their pride in the empire to which they belong. Every colony has gone its own way in these matters: Australia has chosen to enact Navigation Laws not very dissimilar to those of the old colonial system; Canada, which regarded with regret the abolition of Imperial preference, when it suited her interests, but when, on its expiry, the States refused to renew it, and caused much financial hardship to the colonies in consequence, all liking for such arrangements was quenched, and when, in 1897, overtures were made for the conclusion of another Reciprocity Treaty, Canada refused them, and retorted by granting to the products of the United Kingdom a preference in her markets without any reciprocal advantage. This brought Imperial preference to the fore again in a new way, and sentiment in its favour was so strong in the mother country as to compel the denunciation of the invidious Commercial Treaties with the German Empire and Belgium, which stood in the way of acceptance of Canada's generous offer. The West Indies, which suffered most by the abolition of the old system of Imperial preference, have always been the strongest advocates of a return to a preferential policy in trade matters. The great agitation of the matter in recent years has made the question one of current politics, and in the era of economic reconstruction which must inevitably follow the present war, some decision

must be come to on the matter of tariffs and commercial regulations within and around the Empire.

The temper in which the political struggles over the question of Imperial Preference were carried on in the period following upon Canada's new adoption of the policy did not conduce to a cool and historical examination of the rival policies at issue, but among the lessons that the present war has taught us, a pregnant one has been the indication that it is not always conducive to national well-being to pursue too expansive a policy of hospitality to foreign enterprise, just as the lessons of history teach us that a policy of national exclusiveness is fatal to progress. The fascinating ideal of a self-sufficing empire is again appealing to the minds of citizens, and it is to be hoped that in striving to ensure a nearer approach to that ideal they will not neglect the valuable guidance that is to be drawn from a study of the story of the old Empire, the real advantages that then accrued both to colonies and mother country from the pursuit of a similar ideal as well as the very grave dangers that it also brought in its train.

V

THE DEPENDENT EMPIRE AND THE NATIVE RACES

In the first lecture of this course it was pointed out how British energy had built up the empire in three ways: first, by emigration into the void; secondly, by the acquisition of tropical territories inhabited by native races of low culture, and, thirdly, by the establishment of domination over highly civilised Orientals. I have already said something about the continuity of our Imperial history in the first and third of these directions, and in this lecture I propose to deal with the second, involving, as it does, a consideration of the acquisition and administration of what are now technically known as "Crown Colonies and Places," but what has also been called more descriptively the "dependent Empire" in contradistinction to the self-governing Dominions.

The growth of this dependent empire in the course of the nineteenth century, and especially within the last quarter of that century, has been vast both in territory and population, and it has hardly been fully realised by the people of these islands, who, by reason of it, have become responsible for the government and general welfare of many millions of subject people in the most diverse stages of cultural development, from the most primitive of races like the

Bushmen of South Africa, the Indians of British Guiana, or the Papuans of New Guinea, up to comparatively cultured races like the Hausas, or the Fulahs of Nigeria, the civilised Malays of Further India, and so to the Maori race in New Zealand, who now in many cases approximate in condition to the British colonists themselves. The diversity of conditions to be dealt with by those who are responsible for the government of this dependent empire are almost infinite, and it might, at first sight, appear impossible to find any principle of government that should cover them all, and yet the difficulty is more apparent than real, and there has been in truth one great and all-pervading method adopted through the numberless devices for dealing with the immediate conditions of these subject races that, being based upon a sound and general principle, enables us to see the history of this extension of British power as a whole.

The story is intimately bound up with, and dependent upon, the experience of British administration in India, and without that experience it is to be doubted whether England could have undertaken the administration of enormous blocks of native territory with such immediate success as she has done in the last forty years. The influence of Indian methods has been both direct and indirect. In Egypt and the Sudan, in Ceylon and the Malay Peninsula, all that was best in Indian methods of administration has been applied to suit local conditions with entire success. But the exigencies of time will not allow me to deal with this side of the subject, and I must also exclude any consideration of our dealings with the Chinese immigrants of Hong Kong and Singapore,

where Indian experience has been less direct in its effects, but still has had a very powerful influence. The history of the old Empire and of British India in the eighteenth century continues down through this channel to the history of the new. If England had entered upon the work of tropical colonisation for the first time in the later nineteenth century, it is much to be doubted whether her rulers could have shouldered the burden of new responsibilities with so great a measure of success. In many instances the early governors of new native territories had had their training in the ranks of the Indian civil or military service, and were familiar with all its high traditions. Other powers who had not this fund of experience to draw upon have fallen into many of the pitfalls in their management of their native subjects that Englishmen learned how to steer clear of in the middle of the eighteenth century, and it is interesting to note how in the sphere of colonial power, as in the social world, the *parvenu* is little liked and makes many blunders from which the ruler of long experience is free. Indian traditions have not been of service only in British colonies, and our American cousins have profited much by them in the government of their new native subjects in the Philippines.

The continuity of Imperial history in the government of primitive peoples is by no means so clearly apparent as it is in other directions. Where the old Empire had to deal with but a few thousands of natives, mostly Red Indians of North America, the new Empire has something over forty millions of native subjects in the Crown colonies alone, a number almost equal to that of the

population of the United Kingdom. We cannot expect, therefore, to find anything more than the germ of our present methods in the records of the earlier Empire, and the matter is complicated, too, by our recollection, perhaps our disproportionate recollection, of the evils of the Slave Trade that vitiated all the relations of the Englishman and the negro for a hundred and seventy years.

The English plantations within the tropics were, during the first fifty years of their existence, dependent, as were those in the temperate zone, for their supply of labour upon the importation of white indentured servants. These indigent men and women took service with their masters, the planters, who were provided with capital sufficient to maintain them, for a definite term of years, usually either three or seven, under nominal indentures of apprenticeship, like those universally prevalent in England at that day. In the comparatively favourable conditions of the mainland colonies, like Virginia, the white servant often served out his indentures under conditions of not much greater hardship than those of the agricultural labourer in England, and having regained his freedom became himself a planter, or took up a salaried position as an overseer or manager on some plantation owned either in the colony or in England. But in the plantations of the West Indies the conditions were much less favourable, the utter inexperience of Englishmen in dealing with a tropical climate, and the perpetual difficulties over food stuffs, caused terrible hardships to the white labourers and an awful rate of mortality. The Spaniards in the Indies and the Portuguese in Brazil had never

attempted to cultivate their plantations with white labour, as did the English and the French, but from quite an early period had purchased negro slaves from the Genoese merchants, who, since the middle of the fifteenth century, had made up the labour deficiencies in Portugal from the West African coast that had been explored by them. The slave market of Lisbon was a great source of labour supply from the middle of the fifteenth century well on into the seventeenth, for both Portuguese and Spaniards were from their long subjection to Moorish rule thoroughly familiar with the use of slave labour for agricultural purposes.

John Hawkins' celebrated attempts at the smuggling of slaves into the Spanish colonies, that ended in disaster in 1569, were the first and last efforts of an Englishman to enter upon the traffic for close on a hundred years, but right on from the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch and Flemings took a very large share in the trade, and made large profits by supplying negroes for the plantations and mines of Spanish America and Brazil. Their raids on the African coast kept the interior in a constant state of war, and almost entirely put a stop to the peaceful trading relations which had at first prevailed between the negroes and Europeans. It was impossible for white men to proceed far inland from the coast, and intercourse between Europeans and the native tribes of the interior of Africa was entirely impracticable until the second half of the nineteenth century, and the settlements of the white men were for three hundred years nothing but isolated and strongly guarded forts round the rim of a continent shrouded in impenetrable darkness.

About the time of the conquest of Jamaica by the English in 1655 they began to find insuperable difficulties in working their plantations in the West Indies with white labour, and as they had at last discovered in sugar a staple product that was extremely profitable, their requirements for labour became very pressing. Under these circumstances they began to purchase negroes from the Dutch traders, who had a surplus to sell, since they had glutted the Spanish market, and after the Restoration, when the West Indies entered on an amazing prosperity, the traffic became so profitable that English merchants determined to begin the transport of negroes on their own account in competition with the Dutch, and as part of the general struggle against them for commercial and maritime supremacy. The Royal African Company was therefore founded, under the patronage of Prince Rupert and the Duke of York, afterwards James II, and Englishmen entered upon the evil traffic in earnest. It was never regarded with favour in England, and was attacked both on moral and religious grounds, though such objections were always suppressed by appeals to the necessities of the West Indian planters for a supply of cheap labour suited to the conditions of a tropical climate.

The arguments that were used for a justification of slavery in the old Empire have not been unheard in connection with some controversies about the exploitation of tropical products in the new, and we ought to realise that the victory of the forces of right and justice in English methods of dealing with subject races in the nineteenth century have only been possible because of

the courageous appeals to the conscience of Englishmen by the opponents of slavery in the eighteenth. The slave trade was certainly a source of profit to some English merchants, but its gains were always precarious, as is shown by the extremely chequered history of the African companies, who were always on the verge of bankruptcy. That opposition to the trade was not confined to moralists and only urged upon ethical grounds, we may realise by a single quotation from one of the best economists of the eighteenth century. Malachi Postlethwaite, himself a member of the African Committee, in his *Universal Dictionary of Trade and Commerce*, published before the break-up of the old Empire, propounds the following queries with regard to the Slave Trade :

"Whether this commerce be not the cause of incessant wars among the Africans.—Whether the Africans, if it were abolished, might not become as ingenious, as humane, as industrious, and as capable of arts, manufactures and trades, as even the bulk of Europeans.—Whether, if it were abolished, a much more profitable trade might not be substituted, and this to the very centre of their extended country, instead of the trifling portion which now subsists upon their coasts.—And whether the great hindrance to such a new and advantageous commerce has not wholly proceeded from that unjust, inhuman, unchristian-like traffic, called the Slave-trade, which is carried on by the Europeans."

The fight for the furtherance of views such as these was a long one and waged with considerable bitterness in the House of Commons and throughout the country, but it served both the British Empire and the cause of

civilisation, for during the course of the seventy years that ended with the Act for the Abolition of Slavery in 1833, it was deeply burnt into the conscience of the English nation that all men, even those who are lowest in the scale of human civilisation, have inalienable rights which can hardly be expressed better than in the words of Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, though he himself would hardly have admitted that they applied to negroes: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are . . . endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, [and] that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just power from the consent of the governed."

The most important sort of historical continuity is what we may call a positive continuity, whereby the precedents of an earlier time are carried on and modified by a series of almost imperceptible changes to meet the new but similar conditions of a later age. But there is also a kind of negative continuity whereby early precedents, that have produced notably evil results, are changed for a diametrically opposite course. Just as a child may learn by bitter experience what course of action to avoid, so England has learned in imperial matters from the bitter experience of the Slave Trade and the lessons imprinted on the conscience of her people during the long fight for its abolition. The lessons of the old Empire with regard to the negro have been learned not as those to follow, but as those to avoid.

The tendency of nations, as of individuals, when they have abandoned a bad course, is to run to excess in an

opposite direction, and the England of the first Reformed Parliament was no exception to the rule. Just as in the eighteenth century she had erred in denying to the negro all rights to liberty, so she erred in the next era by accepting the dictum of Jefferson that I have omitted from my quotation, that "all men are equal," and rushed to confer upon the negroes of her African possessions all the political rights of citizenship that were possessed by her own people resident there. The results were necessarily evil, for though all men have equal rights to liberty and justice, their claim to the full political rights of citizenship must be judged by their capacity to exercise their rights for their own good and that of the political community in which they dwell. In the politics of South Africa questions as to the treatment of native races have played a peculiarly unfortunate part, and well-meaning but visionary philanthropy, that was entirely ignorant of local conditions and thought that the practical business of government could be carried on by a pedantic and inflexible adherence to the maxims of the copy-book, involved the sub-continent in much trouble and bloodshed. The wire-pulling influence of the philanthropists of Exeter Hall over the British Government in the middle Victorian period led the Colonial Office into many unfortunate mistakes, and its indulgence in much uninformed interference with local administration as regards the negro imbued the white colonists with that contempt and dislike for "Downing Street" that made them regard it as characterised mainly by a meddlesome ineptitude and a pharisaical fussiness about matters it neither troubled to examine nor understand.

The period of indifference to what are now the Self-Governing Dominions, when the most advanced social reformers believed our colonial possessions to be politically mischievous and declared that the nation would be much better off without them than with them, was also characterised by an unreasoning readiness on the part of the same reformers to believe that any Englishman who passed oversea and came into contact with the negro was thereby changed into a ferocious slave-driver who could in nowise be trusted to guide his relations with the subject race aright, but must be continually checked and thwarted by interference from home. As time has gone on it has become clear that each of these views was equally false, and men came to see not only that our colonies are a political and commercial necessity, but that there is a clear line of demarcation between those in the temperate zone and those in the tropics. In the former homogeneous communities of European descent have developed and attained to nationhood with appropriate constitutions under the supremacy of the British Crown and the fullest responsibility for solving their own administrative and social problems. In our tropical possessions, however, we have come to see that a long and gradual process of material and political development is necessary under the administrative control of the white race, and that such development can only take place when there is an enduring partnership between the white and coloured races. Some other European powers that have taken a hand in the development of tropical possessions in the latter part of the nineteenth century have failed to recognise the necessity of such a partnership, and

have sought progress in a ruthless exploitation of the native races for the profit of their rulers, but Britain has been saved from such a policy by her previous experience in India and in her American colonies, where she had found it possible to govern races far different from her own by insistence upon those principles of justice, order, and respect for right that have been the cardinal virtues of our English system.

If we turn to the relations of the old Empire with native races other than the negro in an attempt to discover whether there are any traces in the story of those relations of an attempt to build up a sound and unselfish policy, we find that from the very beginning Englishmen gained their first footing on the American shore by virtue of agreements with the chiefs of the Indian tribes who hunted there, and the stories of all the early colonies are filled with negotiations and treaties with the first owners of the soil, as, for example, that of Warnes with Togreman, the Carib chief, on which the first English title to St. Christopher was based. Taking all in all, we may say that English relations with the natives were good and peaceable, and it was only at a later date, and after the colonies had become thoroughly settled, that difficulties arose concerning the wide extent of territory that had been transferred by the original treaty from the Indians to the white man, and there was an outbreak of serious war between the two races. The conclusion of treaties between a highly civilised race and unsophisticated aborigines may not involve any great consideration for native rights, and the arrangements will almost certainly enure to their disadvantage, but the desire to acknowledge even

in this way the claims of the first owners of the soil does, at least, ensure that the dominant race shall have some respect for justice and legality.

The practice of Spain in gaining a foothold on American soil was different, and was derived from the doctrine of mediæval Christendom, that the infidel has no rights to the land, and that the only duty of Christians towards him is to ensure that he shall be brought to the True Faith. The rights of Spanish settlers to their lands have solely been based upon the right of conquest, while those of Englishmen and Frenchmen, the latter an important matter in Canada, have always been based upon agreements with native chiefs, or what is known as "Indian title."

The early English colonising companies were by no means indifferent to missionary enterprise, and this object was almost always stated among those justifying the establishment of colonies. A quotation from the first instructions given to the Englishmen who came into contact with the Moskito Indians of Central America, a tribe with whom England remained in the closest and most friendly relations for over two hundred years, may illustrate this point. Writing in 1633, John Pym, the Treasurer of the Providence Company that was attempting to found a colony on the shores of Nicaragua, gave to his employees the following directions: "Because the hope of the business [of colonisation] most specially depends upon God's blessing, therefore we pray and require you to make it your first and principal care to carry God along with you in all places by the diligent performance of holy duties in your own person, and by setting up and

preserving the true worship of God in the hearts and lives of all your company, so far as you shall be able. Also to restrain and prevent to your utmost power all sins and disorders, as swearing, drunkenness, uncleanness or the like, which will render the name of Christian odious to the very heathen, and be infinitely prejudicial to the business you take in hand by drawing the curse of God upon your endeavours. You are to endear yourselves with the Indians and their commanders, and we conjure you to be friendly and cause no jealousy. . . . They must be free men, drawn to work by reward, and they must be entertained by kind usage and be at liberty to return at pleasure."

The long course of relations between England and these Moskito Indians of the Nicaraguan coast affords ample means, among its many unprinted records, for tracing the development of native policy in the old Empire, but it may be studied in many such documents and notably in the more accessible and printed sources that are afforded in the correspondence of its agents with the home Government concerning the management of the Indians of that Illinois country between the mountains and the Mississippi which was conquered from France along with the colony of Canada in 1763.

In 1755, when the British Government sent General Braddock to command the military forces in America and to guard against the menacing power of the French, it was determined to remove Indian affairs from the control of the separate colonial governments, which had produced a good deal of overlapping and confusion, and to place them under Imperial control. Sir William Johnson, of the colony of New York, who had done

much trading with the Iroquois tribes and was highly respected by them, was chosen to be "sole superintendent of the affairs of the Six United Nations, their allies and dependents," and for nearly twenty years, till his death in 1774, he held the position. His advice was most carefully and favourably listened to by the British Government, he handled the situation in regard to the Indians with considerable success, and he worked out a thorough and efficient system of dealing with native races, which he expounded in long and carefully written dispatches to the Colonial Secretaries at home. Johnson died before the outbreak of the Revolution, and by the Treaty of Versailles the Indians, both of the Thirteen Colonies and of the newly won Illinois country, were handed over to be dealt with by the Government, or, rather, lack of government, in those days, of the United States, but Britain still retained Indian subjects in her unceded North American possessions, and the plans that Johnson had laid down continued to influence Britain's plans for dealing with them, and have undoubtedly led down through an unbroken chain to the Indian policy of the Dominion of Canada to-day, which has also derived from the parallel historical development of the long Indian experience of the Hudson Bay Company. It is hard to say whether the experience gained with the Indians has had any effect upon our policy with regard to native races in other parts of the world, but when we remember that both Canadian affairs and those of other colonies were, from 1783 to 1840, under the direct control of the same set of officials in the Colonial Office, it does not seem unlikely that the precedents of British North America may have had

some influence, say, in Sierra Leone, peopled as it was largely by negroes from Nova Scotia, when new methods had to be adopted in place of the old brutal rapacity of the slave-hunters of an earlier time.

Though in the practice of the eighteenth century there was the germ of our modern policy of governing subject races for their own good, and in such a way as to ensure their gradual advancement in the scale of civilisation, it has been reserved for the administrators of the new Empire to carry that policy into effect on a great scale, and the major part of the work has been done in the course of the last forty years. It is impossible here to trace out even in outline the development of the policy, and all that I can do is to make a few general statements concerning it, and to say something about the central machinery by which it has been carried into effect.

While in the self-governing empire the problems to be dealt with have been preponderantly political, and material development has only filled a very subordinate part, and has been rightly left to the initiative and resources of the individual citizens, in the dependent empire the reverse has been the case. The problems of political government have been comparatively simple, and have only exhibited much difficulty where the Crown colonies, owing to the presence of populations of European descent, approximate in a greater or less degree to the condition of dominions. In colonies like Jamaica and Mauritius, where this is the case, it has required considerable skill and judgment on the part of the Colonial Office at home and the governors abroad to steer a middle course in the political sphere, and to ensure that the white popula-

tions in the colonies, who are capable of exercising the full rights if citizenship, shall be to some extent masters of their fate; though even here, owing to the essential financial necessity of relying upon the resources of the Imperial Exchequer to save the colonies from bankruptcy, it has been impossible to grant full responsibility, and there has grown up a whole gradation of governmental forms from what is almost responsible government in purely local affairs, such as there is in Jamaica and Barbados, downwards to purely benevolent despotism.

The general tendency in colonies and protectorates where there has remained any practicable form of indigenous native government has been to retain and strengthen its forms and to exercise the despotic control of the Imperial Government to guide and permeate this native government with the proper spirit and to use its forms wherever possible to carry Imperial policy into effect. Such work has been done, for example, in the native states of the Malay Peninsula and the great province of Nigeria, but there are many other instances in the tropical parts of the world. Our policy has been directed to solve the problem of the strong living with the weak for the general benefit of the empire and mankind, and yet so living as to ensure the safeguarding of those fundamental interests of the weaker races that are also the interests of all—the assurance of peace, the maintenance of order and justice by the forms of law to the exclusion of caprice on the part of the governors, the enforcing of the conception of equality of rights before the law, the discouraging of any destructive tendency towards exploitation of the weak by the strong, and the building up of a State wherein every

man, however low in the scale of civilisation, can be raised, little by little, through the processes of education, political and social, to secure the fullest expression of himself. The time is far distant until all native communities, when educated and civilised, can be admitted *en masse* to the full political rights of citizenship in the empire, but it may be claimed with truth that it has now for many years been the settled policy of the new Empire to regard every native as a potential citizen, to whose advancement every step in his instruction and management must conduce. The phrase " the White Man's burden " has been misused and cheapened, as have all good phrases, but, at any rate, the ruling races of this empire have done their best to shoulder that burden.

I showed in an earlier lecture how the Colonial Office in the nineteenth century has gradually bifurcated into two branches : the Dominions Department dealing with the self-governing dominions, and the undifferentiated remainder. The only Imperial officials in the self-governing colonies have for many years been the governors, no longer executive officials, but rather in the position of constitutional rulers, only capable of taking formal action through and with the advice of their ministerial advisers, who are responsible to the elected legislatures. In the Crown colonies, however, there is a complete hierarchy of Imperial officials, and there has grown up under the control of the Colonial Office a great Colonial Civil Service recruited both at home and in the colonies themselves. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, wielding, as I have shown, the ancient executive power of the Crown, is, therefore, still a most important administrative officer, and as his functions have increased and become more and

more complex, so he has had to build up within the Colonial Office a more and more differentiated system for the carrying out of these functions. The first tendency, which was characteristic of the middle period of the nineteenth century, was to divide the department into sub-departments, each charged with all matters relating to the colonies in one particular geographical area and working almost independently of the others.

But this system gave rise to many difficulties and considerable overlapping, and during the momentous Colonial Secretaryship of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, that marked an epoch in the empire's history, it was abandoned for one better adapted to secure continuity of policy, not only in time from one Secretary of State to another, and in each colony from one governor to another, which has always been one of the aims of British policy, but also in space from each part of the dependent empire to every other. The political and general government of all the Crown colonies was entrusted to the undifferentiated secretariat charged with their general management through the Colonial Service composed of all ranks, from governors and colonial secretaries down to clerks and cadets, while the material well-being of the colonies was entrusted to various sub-departments. The commercial and financial requirements of the colonies were confided to the care of the office of the Crown Agents for the Colonies, who became the advisers and agents both of the Secretary of State and the local governments, both in the task of raising loans in the city for the financing of public works and other purposes and in the expenditure of such loans. The office of Crown Agent for a Colony has a very long and interesting history behind it, dating far

back into the period of the old Empire, and it would be an interesting subject of inquiry to trace its development and that of the parallel office of Agent-General, which belongs to the self-governing dominions, from the agents of the American and West Indian plantations in London in the eighteenth century.

The control of measures directed to securing the health of the populations in the Crown colonies and the fostering of research into the problems of tropical diseases was entrusted to the sub-department of the Medical Adviser to the Colonial Secretary, while matters relating to the exploitation of tropical products were left to be dealt with by the expert departments of the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew and the laboratories of the Imperial Institute, which is closely under the control of the Colonial Office. The importance of the material development of our tropical dependencies is attracting more and more attention on the part of the home Government, and various agencies have been set up, partly from funds provided by Parliament and partly by private enterprise, to further special objects in this direction. The problems of tropical exploitation are still a long way from solution, for they involve a complex interplay of social, political and economic factors that makes immense demands upon the capacities of those who have to deal with them. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century new nations have taken up tasks that were previously familiar only to Britain and to Holland, but none have yet succeeded in displacing the British Empire from that priority of success in the administration of native races that has been attained by long and patient experiment.

VI

STEPS TOWARDS IMPERIAL UNITY

THE process of development within the outer lands of the British Empire along two widely divergent lines has, within the last thirty or forty years, been more clearly realised by the people in the United Kingdom, and a new nomenclature has come into everyday use to express differences that, at an earlier date, were hardly recognised. Even as lately as the middle of the Victorian era it was customary, both in official publications and in common speech, to class all the territories beyond the sea that owned the sway of the British Crown as "dependencies," and, except in the case of India, which has always filled a different position, to use this term and the term "colonies" as synonymous.

They have long ceased to be so, for whereas the former term has been narrowed down to signify those parts of the empire that are paternally governed from the outside, the word "colonies" is still used loosely to include any possessions beyond the sea, save India. The Secretary of State for the *Colonies* is still the channel of communication with the Dominion of Canada and the local government of Sierra Leone, and the great society that during the half century of its existence has done so much to foster the interests of an United Empire, and

is concerned alike with self-governing white dominions and with tropical possessions where there may be but a handful of men of British stock, bears the name of "The Royal *Colonial* Institute." The present nomenclature, however, recognises three groups among the oversea possessions of the Crown.

(*a*) "Self-governing Dominions." The Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Union of South Africa, the Dominion of New Zealand, and the Colony of Newfoundland have almost the status of independent nations. With their internal affairs and with their commercial relations with foreign countries the Imperial Parliament has nothing to do, but foreign policy that may vitally affect their well-being is still directed by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in whose appointment the peoples of the dominions have no say.

(*b*) "India," the common term used to cover those vast Asiatic territories whose peoples owe varying degrees of allegiance, not to the monarch as King of the United Kingdom, but as Emperor of India. The Indian Empire, consisting of British India under direct rule and of many Feudatory States, each administered by its own ruler, is self-contained and governed for the benefit of its inhabitants nominally from London, but in reality in accordance with the dictates of a carefully preserved tradition that is guarded and administered by a class of Englishmen of the Indian Civil Service whose whole lives are devoted to the task. Indian affairs are being removed more and more from the detailed consideration of the overburdened Imperial Parliament, and India is approaching closer to autonomy, though in

matters of first-rate importance Parliament still exercises supreme influence.

(*c*) " The Dependencies," including Crown colonies. These are governed by the Colonial Office, which works under the closely exercised scrutiny of Parliament, and is subject to criticism for any of its actions. For these dependencies the Exchequer of the United Kingdom is financially responsible, and Imperial control is real and direct. There are also under the control of the Foreign Office various protected native states, but these are gradually approximating to the condition of " dependencies," and there is a general tendency to transfer them to the care of the Colonial Office and to deal with them according to its usual methods. Egypt and the Sudan occupy an anomalous and at present indeterminate position, but the methods employed for their government under the Foreign Office approximate to those used in India, and they are controlled according to the same principles.

It now becomes our task to inquire whether, in this empire comprising governments of widely divergent types, there are to be discerned any tendencies towards a more closely knit organisation, and whether these tendencies have any roots in the history of the old Empire, such as we have seen to exist in detailed matters of administration. Political communities that are faced by common difficulties and are not too far removed geographically from one another, are strongly drawn to meet those difficulties with common action and according to an agreed plan. When the communities are fully sovereign states, the union for joint purpose takes the form of an alliance wherein each state fully retains its

freedom of action and unanimity is necessary before anything can be done. Such an alliance is usually directed to a military end either of defence or offence, and it is dissolved when the causes of its formation are removed. The earlier British colonies were formed by independent effort and stood to one another very much in the fashion of small separate states, their only common superior, the power of the Crown, being so far removed as to exercise little joint control. We find them behaving to one another, though, of course, only on a very small scale, just as though they were entirely independent; the colonists of Virginia undertook actual military operations against Lord Baltimore's immigrants into Maryland, and the men of Massachusetts behaved towards Mason and Gorges' colonists on the shores of Maine in a way very little less harsh than that in which the Virginia Company treated the French colonists on the same coast. The separative tendency was far more characteristic of all the colonies of the old Empire than any tendency to unite, and when any colonies did combine for common action of their own free will, they did so only in the face of a really pressing danger, and behaved exactly like powers that were foreign to one another, the alliance being dissolved by mutual consent as soon as the danger was removed.

Union of the colonies by their own free will was not the only form of union, for on occasion union was forced upon them by the action of the Crown, the most noticeable attempt in this direction being made in the later Stuart period, when James II, in 1685, annulled the charters of the New England colonies one after another, and united them all with New York into a consolidated

province under the government of Sir Edmund Andros. The union, though designed to secure better defence against the Indian menace, was bitterly resented by the colonists, and they were preparing for armed resistance to it when the abdication of James II removed the necessity, the government of Andros at once collapsed, and the colonies resumed their independence relative to one another, and all their separative tendencies had full scope. The temporary union of the colonies of their own free will for common purposes had taken place forty years before in face of a pressing danger of attack by the powerful Indian tribes that surrounded them. The colonies of Connecticut, New Haven, Plymouth and Massachusetts confederated in 1643 to provide for joint measures against the threatened expansion of the Dutch colony of New Netherland into the territory behind the British settlements and for general defence. The New England Confederation, as it was called, was rather a league of independent states who contributed men and money for a common purpose than any closer union, and was marked by all the difficulties and jealousies that characterise such leagues, and when once the fears of Dutch aggression were removed it fell asunder and the colonies resumed all their earlier freedom and independence of action.

In the face of the dangerous French menace in North America, in the first half of the eighteenth century, common action on the part of the English colonies was conspicuous by its absence, and such common measures as were taken were imposed upon the colonists by the Home Government in the face of constant opposition, both covert and overt. The English ministers

endeavoured to secure that assistance should be rendered against the French by all the colonies, but it was found impossible to get any adequate help from New England, and Virginia, the colony most threatened by French attack, was left to bear the brunt alone, save for the assistance afforded from the mother country. This state of affairs was so unsatisfactory and so disquieting to the most far-seeing among the colonists, that after the inconclusive Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, men's minds were turned to find some means of common action, and publicists, like Benjamin Franklin, began to contemplate the possibility of uniting the colonies into a single system, so that all the powers of England in North America might be turned towards a common end. The difficulty caused by the forward policy of the governors of Canada had been rendered more serious by their success in attracting the most powerful Indian tribes to alliance with them, and the British colonies were threatened with all the horrors of a serious Indian invasion, to which the disunited colonies, each with its own separate Indian policy or lack of consistent policy, would be unable to oppose any effective resistance. Urged on, therefore, by the prompting of certain far-seeing men in America, the British Government in 1753 summoned representatives from all the more important colonies to meet at Albany in the middle colony of New York, there to consider the possibility of a union of all of them for their common security and defence.

This Albany convention, called for an express purpose and attended by commissioners who came bound by no special instructions but with the duty of working out a practicable plan, is of great interest in the history of the

empire as the first of the long line of conventions that have met since with similar purposes. It had certain precedents in the earlier history of England when, faced with some great and pressing difficulty, the representatives of the people have met to take counsel together for one express purpose unfettered by the traditional forms that govern them in parliaments and assemblies. The conventions of the Restoration in 1660 and the Revolution in 1688 differed in form from colonial conventions, but they were infused by the same spirit, whereby in the face of a great national emergency the people send their delegates to take counsel together in full palaver and talk things right out in the earnest desire to find a comprehensive remedy for their ills. There are earlier instances of such meetings in English history when men could only cope with their difficulties unshackled by a rigid insistence upon the regular political forms of their time, and when they had to work out their plans for reconstruction in a spirit of compromise. To speak of the barons' meeting at Runnymede or the earliest meetings of Parliament as having any connection with colonial conventions in the eighteenth and nineteenth century may seem fanciful, but one can trace many analogies between them and can discern through the long course of English history a succession of such "comings together," when in the face of hard realities men had to throw aside their leisurely and ceremonious political procedure of normal times and betake themselves to simpler and more primitive means of securing agreement on fundamental constitutional principles.

The Albany Convention of 1753 sat in private for

some time, and under the prompting of Benjamin Franklin drew up a detailed plan for an organic union of the colonies which was unanimously accepted by the delegates. Before the plan could be adopted, however, it had to be ratified by the colonial assemblies who had appointed the delegates. Franklin saw that the final carrying out of the plan must be through an Act of the British Parliament, the only legislative body that could see the problem whole and that could pass legislation affecting all the colonies; but the home Government wisely remembered from the earlier history of the empire that no such plan could be forced upon the colonists without their consent, and determined to wait for its ratification by the assemblies before taking action; but such ratification proved entirely impracticable in the face of the particularism and parochial outlook of the assemblies, and Franklin wrote in despair: "All the Assemblies in the colonies have, I suppose, had the Union Plan laid before them, but it is not likely, in my opinion, that any of them will act upon it so as to agree to it or to propose any amendments to it. Everybody cries, a Union is absolutely necessary, but when they come to the manner and form of the union, their weak noddles are perfectly distracted."

Franklin's prescience was not at fault, and when Wolfe's great victory at Quebec removed the French menace, the colonial assemblies were confirmed in their obstinate refusal to surrender any part of their autonomy. All hopes of uniting the colonies within the British Empire were destroyed, and when the next joint meeting of colonial representatives took place it was in the first mutterings of the coming storm, and was

designed not to further, but to thwart, Imperial policy. The need for common action for the defence of the colonies that had proved impossible of attainment by mutual agreement led the Government to take the easiest course that lay open to them—to provide the necessary forces at the expense of the British taxpayer and to attempt to recover the cost by the imposition of duties upon external trade, such duties to be collected by a reorganised and efficient Imperial system of revenue officials. This course was met by unanimous opposition and obstruction on the part of the colonists, and the more liberal statesmen, both in Great Britain and America, attempted to find a way out of the difficulty by proposing the representation of the colonists in the Imperial Parliament and the conversion of the British Empire into a unitary state.

Traditions of particularism were again too strong for them, the plan was shown to be utterly impracticable owing to the extreme differences of condition and outlook in the various parts of the empire, and the colonies came together only in the Stamp Act Congress of 1765 to concert joint measures against the proposals of the British Government. The Congress met in New York, and prepared petitions to King George III, asking for the repeal of the duties imposed upon the colonies by the Stamp Act of the British Parliament, and resolutions were adopted declaring that Parliament had no right to tax the colonies. The Congress was a real colonial convention to cope with a pressing difficulty, and since it marks the first concerted action by the colonies in face of the Imperial Government it is therefore an important stage in the history of the empire.

The further steps taken by the colonies in their resistance to the royal power need not concern us, but we may remark as the struggle went on how it resulted in bringing about closer and closer alliance between the colonies, at every crisis leading to further meetings of delegates after the nature of conventions, such as the First Continental Congress that met at Philadelphia in 1774 to consider " the united interest of America." The existence of a party in the colonies that desired to exaggerate and intensify the difficulties with the mother country in order to secure their independence was matched by that party in England who used the grievances of the colonists as a means of attack upon the King and his ministers, so that the armed struggle when it came was in its early stages rather a civil war between factions within the empire than a fight between one part of the empire and another. But even when the Tories had been thrust out from the colonies to become the United Empire Loyalists and to found a new empire, the necessity of unity was only learned by those who fought for independence by the slow and gradual process of experience, and even the difficulties and trials of the war were insufficient to teach the Whigs that something more than an alliance between sovereign States was necessary if the dearly won independence of the new United States of America was to be maintained.

The period immediately following the close of hostilities was, in some ways, more difficult and dangerous than even the war itself, just as the period of Reconstruction that followed the American Civil War of 1861–1865 was full of extreme troubles and of danger. The narrow parochial interests of the States led them to

follow their own desires and shirk responsibilities for the common defence in every way possible, and regardless of the interests of their neighbours.

America was lucky in possessing men like George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, of the highest capacity for statesmanship, and they were convinced that no alliance between sovereign commonwealths would suffice to cope with the dangers that faced them. Under their influence, therefore, the device of a convention quite independent of the ruling authorities was once more resorted to, at first only to deal with the mere question of customs duties between the various States.

The Customs Convention met at Annapolis in 1786, and as soon as it began to consider the subject sincerely, its members found that the real question to be dealt with was infinitely wider than any question of detail. In the crisis with which the States were faced it became clear that the only prospect of solution lay in the calling of a convention with entirely unlimited powers, wherein the delegates should be free to discuss all the difficulties on broad grounds of principle. The Annapolis Convention, therefore, adjourned to Philadelphia, where it met again, behind closed doors, in May 1787, and set to work on an entirely fresh field, and to examine the whole basis of government unfettered, as far as it might be, by anything that had gone before. From May to September 1787 the Convention pursued its labours, and found that it was only possible to secure any advance, not by the imposition of the will of the majority upon the minority, but by arriving at a series of compromises between divergent views with which every one could agree.

Here we have, as it seems to me, the essential difference between the meeting of a convention and that of a legislative assembly. In Parliament decisions are made by a majority vote, and the minority, bound by long tradition, are willing in the long run to acquiesce, but in a convention such acquiescence cannot be obtained, and it is necessary to arrive at a compromise in which every one will join. Confronted with the choice between comparative anarchy and a prospect of good government, men of English stock, who have governed themselves for centuries and who have inherited a kind of political intuition, a sort of ancestral memory of past compromises, are willing to give way a little on matters in which in more peaceful times they would insist on having their way. Such were the matters on which, in the fateful Convention of 1787, the delegates came bit by bit to agreement until, finally, there was evolved a Constitution that, out of thirteen disunited sovereign States, made a nation, and that, when accepted by popular vote throughout the States, came into operation in 1789, the same year that saw the break-up of the old French system and the embarkation of France upon a course of constitutional change marked by an entirely different temper, and carried through by methods as different as they well could be.

Though the Convention of 1787 was marked by a wonderful spirit of compromise that made its work of nation building lasting, it could not carry that work to completion, and what it did gives, in some ways, an example to avoid as well as an example to follow. In the first place, it left unsolved the most difficult point of all: it neither made a complete and unitary govern-

ment with the old States merely left as provinces, nor, on the other hand, did it leave the States with their powers unimpaired ; they simply transferred a part of those powers into the hands of the national government and, as some maintained, retained all final power in their own hands. The solution of the question, whether the Union were a nation or only a close league of states, did not come for seventy years, and involved the United States in a terrible civil war before the Federal majority could impose its will upon the Confederate minority, and prove the Union to be one and indivisible. The other evil in the work done by the Convention was its rigidity and, to some extent, its crudity. This is, I think, the best lesson for us to-day to learn from its story ; where its members devoted their attention to clearing up by practical devices difficulties with which they were all familiar, their work was well and truly done and has been lasting, but where they left the practical sphere and evolved from their own inner consciousness logically complete systems of government they were bounded, as are the men of every age, by the limitations of their time, and when they made their devices as binding upon posterity as they could they placed the dead hand of their limitations upon their descendants, and crippled and stunted their political growth towards complete liberty and adaptability. But however crippling the system within which it is confined, political growth will go on, and the United States has been no exception to this rule, for many of the most admired devices of the Convention of 1787 have been twisted without formal enactment in ways never intended by their authors, and the constitutional history

of the United States affords many instances of the fictions and unwritten assumptions that are necessary to make even a rigid system work, and that in our own formless and happily flexible constitutional practice abound.

While the Revolution gave to America her independence it won for England the final victory in the long struggle between King and Parliament, which was henceforth supreme. In the new Empire the control of Parliament over the colonies was so absolute and so repeatedly exercised that there could be no possibility for groups of colonies freely to come together into organic union until their peoples were masters of their own fate, though the British Government could impose union from the outside, as it did when Upper and Lower Canada were united under a single government after the Rebellion of 1837. But when responsible government had once been granted to the colonies in British North America the way for free growth lay open, and once more it was stimulated by external difficulties and the union of colonies was fostered by the need of overcoming a danger that affected them all alike. In the middle of the nineteenth century there were in British North America, besides the united colony of Canada, the Maritime Provinces of Nova Scotia, including Cape Breton Island, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island, inhabited by a homogeneous community of the same race with identical interests and faced by the same economic difficulties, but each provided with its own apparatus of legislature and executive, and none of them strong enough to face its difficulties alone. Though there were many reasons urging the Maritime Provinces

to union among themselves, there were also many reasons to prevent their confederation with the greater colony upon the St. Lawrence, which was faced with its own difficulties owing to the presence within it of the British colonists of Upper Canada and the French in Quebec. Luckily, however, as time went on and the gift of responsible government did its work, divisions in Canada ceased to be traced upon racial lines, and parties divided, so that men of each race were found upon opposite sides. But this resulted in almost a complete deadlock in government, and it seemed impossible to find a way out from unceasing party wrangles. There was in the minds of the more far-seeing Canadian statesmen a desire to open up the still virgin lands of the North-West, and to carry the British flag right across the continent to the Red River Settlement and onwards to the new British colony that had been founded upon the shores of the Pacific. Such a task was too great to be undertaken solely with the means at the disposal of Canada, and men began to look forward to the possibility of a confederation of all the British North American colonies which would be strong enough for any work.

All the colonies were faced alike with economic distress, owing to the running out of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 with the United States, Canada's best customer, the certainty that it would not be renewed and the inevitable loss of the best and nearest market for their products. The difficulty being a pressing one, and shared in common by all, but specially by the Maritime Provinces, the traditional device was adopted, and the Maritime Provinces agreed to meet in Convention unfettered by past arrangements and by full discussion

to find a way out. The Conference, or Convention, met at Charlottetown in 1864, where only the Maritime Provinces were represented, but it was at once seen that it was futile to deal with only a portion of the problem, and the Convention adjourned to Quebec, there to deal with all the matters at stake in the broadest possible way. Again the typical methods of a convention were adopted where independent powers were in treaty, and where, therefore, matters could only be decided with unanimity, where it was impossible for a majority to secure acquiescence in its decisions by a minority, and where, therefore, it was necessary for all men to use their powers to the utmost in order to secure compromises that would work. The convention sat behind closed doors, and as its proceedings were not reported it was possible for men to consider only the work in hand, regardless of what their constituents would think of them. Seventy-two resolutions were at length agreed upon to bring about the proposed confederation, but before they could be carried into effect they had to receive the adhesion of the peoples of the various colonies, and the securing of this adhesion proved the most difficult part of the process, as it is always likely to be when changes are in contemplation that will profoundly affect the interests of all concerned. It took nearly two years of intense political activity, and many dangers had to be surmounted before the delegates of all the colonies could come to England charged with powers to effect the final stage, and in concert with the Imperial Government to secure the passage through Parliament of the Bill in which the resolutions of the convention had been embodied, and which,

when it received the Royal assent, became the British North America Act of 1867, the charter of Canadian confederation.

The history of the Dominion of Canada shows how, even when all the parties are inclined towards federation as a means of surmounting common difficulties and the initiative comes from among them, yet immense obstacles have to be overcome before agreement can be arrived at. But when the initiative comes from the outside and a scheme of federation is urged upon the colonists by external authority, the history of South Africa shows us that the difficulties become so great as to be insurmountable, and outside pressure really does more harm than good. The first mention of a policy of federation in South Africa, as far back as 1856, is due to Sir George Grey, then Governor of Cape Colony, but responsible government was not then in operation, and it was not until after 1872, upon the granting of responsible government to the Cape, that the Colonial Secretary of the time, Lord Carnarvon, attempted to thrust a scheme of confederation upon South Africa modelled upon that in Canada. A conference was summoned to discuss the scheme in London, but this did not partake in the least of the essentially free-will nature of a convention, and in spite of all that could be done the project resulted rather in the intensification of South Africa's difficulties than in their amelioration. Though Lord Carnarvon insisted on pushing his scheme through, and an Act on the model of the British North America Act was passed by the Imperial Parliament in 1877, it never came into operation, and in 1882 its provisions lapsed.

The lesson was not lost upon the home Government, and it was not until responsible government had been granted to the newly conquered territories after the South African War that the question of union again became a matter of practical politics. What had been impossible and even mischievous when thrust upon the colonies from outside, became capable of achievement when men came to see that only by means of union could be found a solution to the crying difficulties that faced war-worn South Africa. Among all the British dominions the subcontinent alone has to cope not only with the problems of the white race, but also with the presence around them of a more numerous and highly prolific negro race. Each of the colonies had its own native policy, marked by a greater or lesser degree of liberality, but the problem was complicated by the presence on their borders of a foreign and aggressive military power in the colony of German South-West Africa, garrisoned with powerful forces, suspected of unworthy designs against British rule, and noted for an exceedingly brutal policy towards its native subjects. In his great Memorandum of 1907, Lord Selborne, the Governor-General, pointed out how essential it was to the well-being of all Afrikanders and of the natives themselves that a common native policy should be adopted in all the colonies. The adoption of such a policy was the greatest difficulty to be dealt with, but many other thorny questions, including that of a Customs Union, were awaiting solution, and men's minds in South Africa were gradually turned towards the only method by which all such questions could be placed in the hands of those who would have power

enough to deal with them. The first step towards union came about, as in the United States and in Canada, upon comparatively minor points, when in May 1908 a conference met at Pretoria to deal with the questions of the tariff and of railway rates. Again the questions merged into the larger one of political union, and in October, 1908, a fully powered Convention met at Durban to talk out the whole problem and to deal with it by what are now becoming the traditional methods of compromise, sheltered by privacy and aided by good will. The Convention sat with only a short vacation at Christmas until February, 1909, and the whole period was filled with negotiations of the most delicate character in order to balance the conflicting interests at stake. Though South African statesmen recognised the desirability of union, there was at first no strong current of public opinion in favour of it, and as such a general consensus is essential for the ratification of any scheme agreed upon by a constitutional convention, great importance must be attached to the propaganda work done by the Closer Union Societies throughout South Africa. They had a fertile field to work upon, for men's minds had been jolted out of their traditional ruts by the happenings of the war, and they were in a mobile condition favourable to the reception of new ideas. When the form of the new Union had been decided on it remained to submit it for ratification to the various legislatures, and, as in Canada, the gaining of their assent was a matter of some difficulty. The process, however, by the exercise of tact and goodwill and backed by public opinion, was at length completed, and the whole of the arrangements agreed upon were registered

by the Imperial Parliament in the South Africa Act, 1909.

The story of the formation of the Australian Commonwealth is in many ways similar to that of the other dominions, but with special features of its own. The colonies have been less interfered with by the outer world than any others, they have had no pressing native problem to deal with and the colonists are of homogeneous race. But, despite all these advantages, it was found impossible to press union upon the colonies from outside. When responsible government was brought into operation in 1850, clauses permitting the union of the colonies for common purposes were inserted in the Australian Government Act at the desire of the Colonial Secretary, Lord Grey. But the colonists would have nothing to do with such suggestions, and considerable friction occurred before the home Government would leave them in peace and cease the attempt to drive them towards a logically designed union at a pace that was faster than they cared to go. The project of federation, however, was not lost sight of, but was still urged by certain statesmen in Australia as a means of facilitating the growth of the colonies. The first urging towards a consideration of the matter as one of practical politics came from a shock administered from the outside. Far removed as Australia is from all other powers, it was with a most unpleasant awakening that she learned of the annexation of Northern New Guinea by the German Empire in 1883, and realised that her peaceful isolation was at an end and that she had now an aggressive neighbour within her own waters. The united Australian colonies would be stronger in face of any

difficulties that might arise than they could be singly, and an incentive to federation was thus supplied. The result was not a very striking move forward, for Australia's difficulties were not yet real enough to overcome her parochial jealousies. Political communities that live far removed from the clash of world politics fail to realise the comparative pettiness of their internal affairs as compared with the great differences of principle that divide nations. England herself has been too insular in her outlook at many periods of her history, and the United States have, till recent years, stood in complete isolation from world problems; the Australian States have been no exception to the rule, and their diverse local interests have always tended to loom larger before their eyes than the more remote difficulties that they might have to face together. The shock of the German annexation was soon forgotten, and the Federal Council Act that was passed by the British Parliament at the request of Australia in 1885 was a very imperfect step forward in the direction of a working union, and was much weakened by the refusal of the oldest colony, New South Wales, to take part.

The next step forward again came from a shock administered from outside, this time in 1889, from a report upon the military defences of Australia, or rather upon its entire defencelessness. This resulted in the summoning of a convention to deal with all the difficulties of the colonies, again as in Canada, in two stages, an informal conference leading on to a national convention with full powers. The Convention met in Sydney in 1891, but it differed in two ways from the Canadian Convention of 1864: the evils to be cured

were not so serious and acute as to make men forget their particularism, and the Convention chose to do its work with open doors and thus fettered by the need of keeping in touch with public opinion. The labours of the members resulted in the preparation of a scheme, but the legislatures of the various colonies refused to have anything to do with it for all kinds of reasons, and the advocates of federation came to realise what we can now see clearly to have been the case in all the dominions, that no such sweeping constitutional change as federation is possible, unless there is an overwhelming body of public opinion either in favour of it or ready to accept any course that will get them out of really serious political difficulties. Since these latter did not exist in Australia, it was necessary to educate public opinion by a positive propaganda. The work of the Australian Natives Association and the Australian Federation League were at length effectual in achieving their purpose, great public enthusiasm was aroused, and in 1897 a new Convention with full powers was assembled in Adelaide, and took up the whole question in a serious way that had not been possible before. There was, in fact, a positive incentive behind the Convention's labours, and though it chose to do its work in public, it was successful at length in producing a scheme which was acceptable to three colonies: Victoria, South Australia, and Tasmania, but not to New South Wales, while Queensland and West Australia stood aloof. However, there was now sufficient driving force to get things done, and at length, in 1899, a scheme agreed to by all the colonies but West Australia was brought to England for registration by the Imperial Parliament.

Much discussion took place with the home Government over certain provisions of the scheme, but in the result it was passed through Parliament exactly in the form in which it had been agreed to by the Australian people.

The self-governing dominions of the Empire now comprise three great unified political communities, but two colonies, each with its own special problems, the Dominion of New Zealand and the Colony of Newfoundland, remain unabsorbed. I have tried to give you in outline the steps that led up to the formation of each of the great schemes of closer union, because, as it seems to me, they illustrate that continuity of Imperial growth which is the main theme of these lectures. The schemes that were drawn up differ in every way, but the process whereby they were reached seems to have been practically the same in each case. Wherever I have directed your attention to this Imperial continuity, I have tried to show that the process of historical growth is still continuing, and that whilst we are studying the history of our own people we are also living it from day to day. Time is one—the Past shades into the Future at a moment that we call the Present, and the continuous processes of the recent past will inevitably be the processes of the immediate future, so that all the free-will of our own generation will of necessity be conditioned by the action of the men who have gone before us. It will not seem entirely unwarrantable, therefore, if we employ an extension of the historic method to examine the broad conditions that will govern the further solution of the problems of Imperial unity. These problems are of peculiar interest to the peoples of the British Empire to-day, for there can be little doubt

that the actions of the next few years will have as great an influence upon the life of the Empire in the future as had those of the people of 1787 upon the life of the United States. The last fifty years have seen the cementing together of three great self-governing nations, each owning the sway of the British Crown, but the last and infinitely the greatest task remains to be done, either by our own generation or by those that will immediately follow it—the cementing of a great organic union of the whole British Empire.

What are the drawbacks and what the assets with which we shall begin the task? We belong to an empire of infinite diversity, containing peoples in every stage of political culture, from the lowest to the very highest, yet bound together only by the slightest of legal links, our common allegiance to the descendant of the long line of English kings; the great self-governing nations, Britain, Canada and the rest, are faced with local problems that differ from one another almost as much as problems can do; the people of these British islands have for centuries been familiar with the conditions, and have borne all the burdens of world power, and they have been rewarded with a wealth and material prosperity that have placed them among the richest peoples of the world; the peoples of the dominions have had to devote their energies to the conquering of the wilderness, they have had little attention to spare to world politics, and though their standard of general well-being is higher, their average wealth has been less than in this country, and they are familiar neither with an excess of riches nor with the problems of grinding poverty. The peoples of India have lived under the

despotic conditions of an Asiatic civilisation, and have become accustomed to look for more than a century past to the Government of the United Kingdom for the guarantee of good and unselfish government, the task of guarding which has been entrusted to the statesmen of Britain alone, and has never been shared with our brothers across the sea. So, too, the many subject peoples of the dependent Empire know that they may rely upon English faith, but few of them know much of the peoples of the dominions, and these know little of them and of their problems. And yet the Empire of the future must contain and satisfy the aspirations of them all.

Federate, unify, if you will, the self-governing peoples of the Empire, and you have only dealt with by far the easier part of the task. India, and the varied diversities of the dependent Empire, remain to be dealt with, unified as yet only in one respect, their reliance on the peoples of the United Kingdom for the order and good government they so highly prize. To whom must they look in a more closely organised empire as their governors? To the people of the United Kingdom as before? In that case the people of the dominions will have little more say in Imperial affairs than they have at present, and the United Kingdom will remain the immensely predominant partner. Or must they look to the ministry of the federated self-governing empire? The peoples of the dominions must, then, shoulder burdens and responsibilities from which they now are free, and must be willing to pledge their credit when necessary to secure the good government of subject peoples in every part of the world. He would

be a bold man who would predict that they will never be ready to do this, but it requires little courage to predict that they will be aided to solve the problem if they can learn all its implications, if, in fact, those whose duty it is to discuss Imperial questions will remember and will bring before their constituents the difficulties and burdens of empire as well as its advantages.

The liabilities that await us when we commence our task of Imperial reorganisation are very great; but, luckily, the assets we possess are greater. The peoples of British stock have a common heritage of political tradition, a store of experience of the methods of democratic self-government that has been gradually accumulated during the centuries, and that gives them a sort of intuitive knowledge of the most likely way of attacking a political problem that is the possession of few other peoples. They owe a real and wholehearted allegiance to a monarchy that has ceased to be swayed by personal caprice, but now works within the lines of a continuous tradition guarded by constantly changing agents who are but the nominees of those they govern, and who have ultimately to answer for their actions to them. The executive tradition is shared in by all parts of the Empire, it is bound by few written instruments, and being handed on from generation to generation it is so flexible that it can be varied gradually to fit almost any circumstances that arise. Consider how even now this executive, prerogative power of the Crown is being varied from day to day to fit the new circumstances of the Empire, and to carry us through the difficult period of transition when the exigencies of war demand the co-operation of every part of the Empire, and yet no

formal machinery exists to secure it. The prerogative, that in the seventeenth century was the enemy of popular government, is now the storehouse of inexhaustible expedients with which to cope with difficult circumstances.

The Crown has since the earliest ages had the right to call upon any of its subjects for advice, and meetings of " the King's servants " can be held to take counsel together as to the advice to be given with a minimum of formality. The first of such informal meetings, to which men from the outer parts of the Empire were invited, took place in London during the Jubilee celebrations of 1887. This was a purely consultative conference for the general ventilation of Imperial matters, and it was followed in 1894 by a partial conference in Ottawa, directed solely to the securing of the co-operation of the dominions represented for certain limited and material ends. The real development of the Imperial Conference began in 1897, when the " Queen's servants," the Premiers of all the self-governing colonies, were summoned to confer together in London under the presidency of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. This was a clear recognition that the people of the dominions must have a larger say in the guidance of empire policy, and since that date the development of the Imperial Conference has gone far and fast. The progress has not been entirely unchecked, for when in 1905 a responsible proposal was put forward to set up an Imperial Council in place of the Conference, the proposal was not welcomed by the colonies, for it meant a forced step aside from the line of development, and would have committed them to formal organisation,

which must necessarily have a continuing life, while the less formal meetings of the conferences at the invitation of the Crown left the colonies free to accept or refuse the invitations as they saw fit.

The conferences of 1907 and 1911 are constitutionally recognisable as meetings of "the King's servants," to use a Restoration phrase, or, if you prefer a Tudor one, we may call them, with propriety, meetings of "Lords of the Council," summoned to advise the Crown on certain matters involving the exercise of the Royal prerogative, which now stretches far beyond the limits of these islands. The meetings differ little in form from the long line of other meetings of the sort throughout the last three centuries, but within the last few months another step forward has been taken, and now the meetings of the King's counsellors from the Empire as a whole are absolutely identical with those of the committee that has swallowed up all the executive functions of the Privy Council. Privy Councillors can only attend those meetings to which they are summoned, and so the Crown calls in different counsellors according to the business to be done. Now on certain days the meetings of the War Cabinet are attended not only by its British members, but also the Secretary of State to speak for India, the Secretary for the Colonies to care for the interests of the dependent Empire, and Privy Councillors from each of the self-governing dominions. These meetings, according to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, have as much power and the same authority as any other meetings of the Cabinet. We seem, in fact, already to have achieved under the ægis of the single institution that is common to all parts of

the Empire, the Crown, a unity of executive control for the purposes of the war that will be one of the greatest of our assets in dealing with our common difficulties in the coming time.

We have another valuable asset in the experience of dealing with these constitutional problems that I have dealt with in this lecture, and which I may call the "Convention method." When the next step forward comes to be taken I believe that we shall inevitably pursue this same method. As I imagine, when the time is ripe there will be summoned by the Royal authority a convention of delegates from the Empire to consider the question of Imperial organisation as a whole; the delegates will work out, behind closed doors and with an unlimited reliance upon the efficacy of compromise, a great plan upon which all can agree, and when the plan is complete, but not before, it will be placed before the peoples of the Empire for their acceptance or refusal. Before their judgment can be made, many further pages of history will have been filled. The members of the first Imperial Convention may be able to agree upon no plan and, even if they do agree, their plan may be unacceptable to those who have appointed them. An essential factor in the success of the Convention method is the existence of an overwhelming public opinion that a forward step towards unity must be taken in the best interests of the Commonwealth. Such a consensus of opinion can be reached only by the widest spread of knowledge concerning the problems to be dealt with. For this spread of knowledge two conditions are necessary: a sincere desire for understanding on the part of every citizen, and a spirit of goodwill. Whatever

happens and whether it is given to this generation or another to see the attainment of an organised democratic empire in which all citizens of full political stature bear an equal part, wherein all have their appointed share in the maintenance of liberty, order and good government, we citizens of the Empire of to-day have, at least, been privileged to see the full realisation of both these primary conditions. The desire for understanding of the Imperial problem grows daily among all classes, and it is one of the most important duties of our universities to do all that they can to satisfy this desire, a duty for the fulfilment of which their new agencies for Imperial studies are designed.

The spirit of goodwill is almost universal. On the fields of Flanders and of Picardy, amid the rocks of Gallipoli and the sands of Mesopotamia, men from all the quarters of the Empire, the heirs of all the proud traditions of our British stock, the descendants of the early pioneers from Holland and old France, men from the ancient world of India together with those from the dependent Empire, who owe to it most of their civilisation, all have been willingly pouring forth their blood that the Empire that they love may live. None can deprive us of the spiritual unity the Empire has there attained, and thereon there will be built, soon or late, the British Commonwealth, the Empire of our dreams.

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